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-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c18
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/events/intel/core.c5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c2
-rw-r--r--include/linux/lsm_hooks.h15
-rw-r--r--include/linux/perf_event.h36
-rw-r--r--include/linux/security.h39
-rw-r--r--kernel/events/core.c63
-rw-r--r--kernel/events/ring_buffer.c24
-rw-r--r--kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c15
-rw-r--r--security/security.c27
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c69
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/classmap.h2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/objsec.h6
-rw-r--r--tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h1
-rw-r--r--tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h6
-rw-r--r--tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h2
-rw-r--r--tools/include/uapi/linux/sched.h30
-rw-r--r--tools/perf/builtin-c2c.c14
-rw-r--r--tools/perf/builtin-kmem.c1
-rw-r--r--tools/perf/util/annotate.c2
-rw-r--r--tools/perf/util/copyfile.c8
-rw-r--r--tools/perf/util/header.c4
-rw-r--r--tools/perf/util/util.c6
25 files changed, 338 insertions, 70 deletions
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c b/arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c
index ca92e01d0bd1..48604625ab31 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ static inline unsigned long perf_ip_adjust(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
return 0;
}
-static inline void perf_get_data_addr(struct pt_regs *regs, u64 *addrp) { }
+static inline void perf_get_data_addr(struct perf_event *event, struct pt_regs *regs, u64 *addrp) { }
static inline u32 perf_get_misc_flags(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
return 0;
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ static unsigned long ebb_switch_in(bool ebb, struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw)
static inline void power_pmu_bhrb_enable(struct perf_event *event) {}
static inline void power_pmu_bhrb_disable(struct perf_event *event) {}
static void power_pmu_sched_task(struct perf_event_context *ctx, bool sched_in) {}
-static inline void power_pmu_bhrb_read(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw) {}
+static inline void power_pmu_bhrb_read(struct perf_event *event, struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw) {}
static void pmao_restore_workaround(bool ebb) { }
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC32 */
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static inline unsigned long perf_ip_adjust(struct pt_regs *regs)
* pointed to by SIAR; this is indicated by the [POWER6_]MMCRA_SDSYNC, the
* [POWER7P_]MMCRA_SDAR_VALID bit in MMCRA, or the SDAR_VALID bit in SIER.
*/
-static inline void perf_get_data_addr(struct pt_regs *regs, u64 *addrp)
+static inline void perf_get_data_addr(struct perf_event *event, struct pt_regs *regs, u64 *addrp)
{
unsigned long mmcra = regs->dsisr;
bool sdar_valid;
@@ -204,8 +204,7 @@ static inline void perf_get_data_addr(struct pt_regs *regs, u64 *addrp)
if (!(mmcra & MMCRA_SAMPLE_ENABLE) || sdar_valid)
*addrp = mfspr(SPRN_SDAR);
- if (perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) &&
- is_kernel_addr(mfspr(SPRN_SDAR)))
+ if (is_kernel_addr(mfspr(SPRN_SDAR)) && perf_allow_kernel(&event->attr) != 0)
*addrp = 0;
}
@@ -444,7 +443,7 @@ static __u64 power_pmu_bhrb_to(u64 addr)
}
/* Processing BHRB entries */
-static void power_pmu_bhrb_read(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw)
+static void power_pmu_bhrb_read(struct perf_event *event, struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw)
{
u64 val;
u64 addr;
@@ -472,8 +471,7 @@ static void power_pmu_bhrb_read(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw)
* exporting it to userspace (avoid exposure of regions
* where we could have speculative execution)
*/
- if (perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) &&
- is_kernel_addr(addr))
+ if (is_kernel_addr(addr) && perf_allow_kernel(&event->attr) != 0)
continue;
/* Branches are read most recent first (ie. mfbhrb 0 is
@@ -2087,12 +2085,12 @@ static void record_and_restart(struct perf_event *event, unsigned long val,
if (event->attr.sample_type &
(PERF_SAMPLE_ADDR | PERF_SAMPLE_PHYS_ADDR))
- perf_get_data_addr(regs, &data.addr);
+ perf_get_data_addr(event, regs, &data.addr);
if (event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_STACK) {
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw;
cpuhw = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_hw_events);
- power_pmu_bhrb_read(cpuhw);
+ power_pmu_bhrb_read(event, cpuhw);
data.br_stack = &cpuhw->bhrb_stack;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
index 5ee3fed881d3..38de4a7f6752 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
@@ -549,9 +549,11 @@ static int bts_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
* Note that the default paranoia setting permits unprivileged
* users to profile the kernel.
*/
- if (event->attr.exclude_kernel && perf_paranoid_kernel() &&
- !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EACCES;
+ if (event->attr.exclude_kernel) {
+ ret = perf_allow_kernel(&event->attr);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
if (x86_add_exclusive(x86_lbr_exclusive_bts))
return -EBUSY;
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
index fcef678c3423..bbf6588d47ee 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
@@ -3315,8 +3315,9 @@ static int intel_pmu_hw_config(struct perf_event *event)
if (x86_pmu.version < 3)
return -EINVAL;
- if (perf_paranoid_cpu() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EACCES;
+ ret = perf_allow_cpu(&event->attr);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
event->hw.config |= ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_ANY;
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c
index dee579efb2b2..a4cc66005ce8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c
@@ -776,8 +776,9 @@ static int p4_validate_raw_event(struct perf_event *event)
* the user needs special permissions to be able to use it
*/
if (p4_ht_active() && p4_event_bind_map[v].shared) {
- if (perf_paranoid_cpu() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EACCES;
+ v = perf_allow_cpu(&event->attr);
+ if (v)
+ return v;
}
/* ESCR EventMask bits may be invalid */
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c
index 74e80ed9c6c4..05e43d0f430b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c
@@ -627,7 +627,7 @@ static struct topa *topa_alloc(int cpu, gfp_t gfp)
* link as the 2nd entry in the table
*/
if (!intel_pt_validate_hw_cap(PT_CAP_topa_multiple_entries)) {
- TOPA_ENTRY(&tp->topa, 1)->base = page_to_phys(p);
+ TOPA_ENTRY(&tp->topa, 1)->base = page_to_phys(p) >> TOPA_SHIFT;
TOPA_ENTRY(&tp->topa, 1)->end = 1;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index a3763247547c..20d8cf194fb7 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1818,6 +1818,14 @@ union security_list_options {
void (*bpf_prog_free_security)(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux);
#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
int (*locked_down)(enum lockdown_reason what);
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
+ int (*perf_event_open)(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type);
+ int (*perf_event_alloc)(struct perf_event *event);
+ void (*perf_event_free)(struct perf_event *event);
+ int (*perf_event_read)(struct perf_event *event);
+ int (*perf_event_write)(struct perf_event *event);
+
+#endif
};
struct security_hook_heads {
@@ -2060,6 +2068,13 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
struct hlist_head bpf_prog_free_security;
#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
struct hlist_head locked_down;
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
+ struct hlist_head perf_event_open;
+ struct hlist_head perf_event_alloc;
+ struct hlist_head perf_event_free;
+ struct hlist_head perf_event_read;
+ struct hlist_head perf_event_write;
+#endif
} __randomize_layout;
/*
diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h
index 61448c19a132..587ae4d002f5 100644
--- a/include/linux/perf_event.h
+++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ struct perf_guest_info_callbacks {
#include <linux/perf_regs.h>
#include <linux/cgroup.h>
#include <linux/refcount.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <asm/local.h>
struct perf_callchain_entry {
@@ -721,6 +722,9 @@ struct perf_event {
struct perf_cgroup *cgrp; /* cgroup event is attach to */
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+ void *security;
+#endif
struct list_head sb_list;
#endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */
};
@@ -1241,19 +1245,41 @@ extern int perf_cpu_time_max_percent_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
int perf_event_max_stack_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
-static inline bool perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw(void)
+/* Access to perf_event_open(2) syscall. */
+#define PERF_SECURITY_OPEN 0
+
+/* Finer grained perf_event_open(2) access control. */
+#define PERF_SECURITY_CPU 1
+#define PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL 2
+#define PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT 3
+
+static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)
{
return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1;
}
-static inline bool perf_paranoid_cpu(void)
+static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
{
- return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0;
+ if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL);
}
-static inline bool perf_paranoid_kernel(void)
+static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
{
- return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1;
+ if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_CPU);
+}
+
+static inline int perf_allow_tracepoint(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
+{
+ if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT);
}
extern void perf_event_init(void);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index a8d59d612d27..0a86bfea64d0 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1894,5 +1894,42 @@ static inline void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
-#endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
+struct perf_event_attr;
+struct perf_event;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+extern int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type);
+extern int security_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event);
+extern void security_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event);
+extern int security_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event);
+extern int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event);
+#else
+static inline int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr,
+ int type)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+}
+
+static inline int security_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+static inline int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+#endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */
+
+#endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 9ec0b0bfddbd..5bbaabdad068 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -4229,8 +4229,9 @@ find_get_context(struct pmu *pmu, struct task_struct *task,
if (!task) {
/* Must be root to operate on a CPU event: */
- if (perf_paranoid_cpu() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
+ err = perf_allow_cpu(&event->attr);
+ if (err)
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
cpuctx = per_cpu_ptr(pmu->pmu_cpu_context, cpu);
ctx = &cpuctx->ctx;
@@ -4539,6 +4540,8 @@ static void _free_event(struct perf_event *event)
unaccount_event(event);
+ security_perf_event_free(event);
+
if (event->rb) {
/*
* Can happen when we close an event with re-directed output.
@@ -4992,6 +4995,10 @@ perf_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
struct perf_event_context *ctx;
int ret;
+ ret = security_perf_event_read(event);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
ctx = perf_event_ctx_lock(event);
ret = __perf_read(event, buf, count);
perf_event_ctx_unlock(event, ctx);
@@ -5256,6 +5263,11 @@ static long perf_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
struct perf_event_context *ctx;
long ret;
+ /* Treat ioctl like writes as it is likely a mutating operation. */
+ ret = security_perf_event_write(event);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
ctx = perf_event_ctx_lock(event);
ret = _perf_ioctl(event, cmd, arg);
perf_event_ctx_unlock(event, ctx);
@@ -5607,8 +5619,10 @@ static void perf_mmap_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
perf_pmu_output_stop(event);
/* now it's safe to free the pages */
- atomic_long_sub(rb->aux_nr_pages, &mmap_user->locked_vm);
- atomic64_sub(rb->aux_mmap_locked, &vma->vm_mm->pinned_vm);
+ if (!rb->aux_mmap_locked)
+ atomic_long_sub(rb->aux_nr_pages, &mmap_user->locked_vm);
+ else
+ atomic64_sub(rb->aux_mmap_locked, &vma->vm_mm->pinned_vm);
/* this has to be the last one */
rb_free_aux(rb);
@@ -5719,6 +5733,10 @@ static int perf_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED))
return -EINVAL;
+ ret = security_perf_event_read(event);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
vma_size = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
if (vma->vm_pgoff == 0) {
@@ -5844,7 +5862,7 @@ accounting:
lock_limit >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
locked = atomic64_read(&vma->vm_mm->pinned_vm) + extra;
- if ((locked > lock_limit) && perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw() &&
+ if ((locked > lock_limit) && perf_is_paranoid() &&
!capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) {
ret = -EPERM;
goto unlock;
@@ -10578,11 +10596,20 @@ perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int cpu,
}
}
+ err = security_perf_event_alloc(event);
+ if (err)
+ goto err_callchain_buffer;
+
/* symmetric to unaccount_event() in _free_event() */
account_event(event);
return event;
+err_callchain_buffer:
+ if (!event->parent) {
+ if (event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN)
+ put_callchain_buffers();
+ }
err_addr_filters:
kfree(event->addr_filter_ranges);
@@ -10671,9 +10698,11 @@ static int perf_copy_attr(struct perf_event_attr __user *uattr,
attr->branch_sample_type = mask;
}
/* privileged levels capture (kernel, hv): check permissions */
- if ((mask & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_PERM_PLM)
- && perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EACCES;
+ if (mask & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_PERM_PLM) {
+ ret = perf_allow_kernel(attr);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
}
if (attr->sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER) {
@@ -10886,13 +10915,19 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
if (flags & ~PERF_FLAG_ALL)
return -EINVAL;
+ /* Do we allow access to perf_event_open(2) ? */
+ err = security_perf_event_open(&attr, PERF_SECURITY_OPEN);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
err = perf_copy_attr(attr_uptr, &attr);
if (err)
return err;
if (!attr.exclude_kernel) {
- if (perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EACCES;
+ err = perf_allow_kernel(&attr);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
}
if (attr.namespaces) {
@@ -10909,9 +10944,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
}
/* Only privileged users can get physical addresses */
- if ((attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_PHYS_ADDR) &&
- perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EACCES;
+ if ((attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_PHYS_ADDR)) {
+ err = perf_allow_kernel(&attr);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
err = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PERF);
if (err && (attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR))
diff --git a/kernel/events/ring_buffer.c b/kernel/events/ring_buffer.c
index ffb59a4ef4ff..246c83ac5643 100644
--- a/kernel/events/ring_buffer.c
+++ b/kernel/events/ring_buffer.c
@@ -754,6 +754,14 @@ static void *perf_mmap_alloc_page(int cpu)
return page_address(page);
}
+static void perf_mmap_free_page(void *addr)
+{
+ struct page *page = virt_to_page(addr);
+
+ page->mapping = NULL;
+ __free_page(page);
+}
+
struct ring_buffer *rb_alloc(int nr_pages, long watermark, int cpu, int flags)
{
struct ring_buffer *rb;
@@ -788,9 +796,9 @@ struct ring_buffer *rb_alloc(int nr_pages, long watermark, int cpu, int flags)
fail_data_pages:
for (i--; i >= 0; i--)
- free_page((unsigned long)rb->data_pages[i]);
+ perf_mmap_free_page(rb->data_pages[i]);
- free_page((unsigned long)rb->user_page);
+ perf_mmap_free_page(rb->user_page);
fail_user_page:
kfree(rb);
@@ -799,21 +807,13 @@ fail:
return NULL;
}
-static void perf_mmap_free_page(unsigned long addr)
-{
- struct page *page = virt_to_page((void *)addr);
-
- page->mapping = NULL;
- __free_page(page);
-}
-
void rb_free(struct ring_buffer *rb)
{
int i;
- perf_mmap_free_page((unsigned long)rb->user_page);
+ perf_mmap_free_page(rb->user_page);
for (i = 0; i < rb->nr_pages; i++)
- perf_mmap_free_page((unsigned long)rb->data_pages[i]);
+ perf_mmap_free_page(rb->data_pages[i]);
kfree(rb);
}
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c b/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c
index 0892e38ed6fb..0917fee6ee7c 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kprobes.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include "trace.h"
#include "trace_probe.h"
@@ -26,8 +27,10 @@ static int total_ref_count;
static int perf_trace_event_perm(struct trace_event_call *tp_event,
struct perf_event *p_event)
{
+ int ret;
+
if (tp_event->perf_perm) {
- int ret = tp_event->perf_perm(tp_event, p_event);
+ ret = tp_event->perf_perm(tp_event, p_event);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
@@ -46,8 +49,9 @@ static int perf_trace_event_perm(struct trace_event_call *tp_event,
/* The ftrace function trace is allowed only for root. */
if (ftrace_event_is_function(tp_event)) {
- if (perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EPERM;
+ ret = perf_allow_tracepoint(&p_event->attr);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
if (!is_sampling_event(p_event))
return 0;
@@ -82,8 +86,9 @@ static int perf_trace_event_perm(struct trace_event_call *tp_event,
* ...otherwise raw tracepoint data can be a severe data leak,
* only allow root to have these.
*/
- if (perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EPERM;
+ ret = perf_allow_tracepoint(&p_event->attr);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 1bc000f834e2..cd2d18d2d279 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2404,3 +2404,30 @@ int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
return call_int_hook(locked_down, 0, what);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
+int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(perf_event_open, 0, attr, type);
+}
+
+int security_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(perf_event_alloc, 0, event);
+}
+
+void security_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ call_void_hook(perf_event_free, event);
+}
+
+int security_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(perf_event_read, 0, event);
+}
+
+int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(perf_event_write, 0, event);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 9625b99e677f..28eb05490d59 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6795,6 +6795,67 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
};
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
+static int selinux_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
+{
+ u32 requested, sid = current_sid();
+
+ if (type == PERF_SECURITY_OPEN)
+ requested = PERF_EVENT__OPEN;
+ else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_CPU)
+ requested = PERF_EVENT__CPU;
+ else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL)
+ requested = PERF_EVENT__KERNEL;
+ else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT)
+ requested = PERF_EVENT__TRACEPOINT;
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT,
+ requested, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec;
+
+ perfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*perfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!perfsec)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ perfsec->sid = current_sid();
+ event->security = perfsec;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
+
+ event->security = NULL;
+ kfree(perfsec);
+}
+
+static int selinux_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__READ, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__WRITE, NULL);
+}
+#endif
+
static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
@@ -7030,6 +7091,14 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_open, selinux_perf_event_open),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_alloc, selinux_perf_event_alloc),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_free, selinux_perf_event_free),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_read, selinux_perf_event_read),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_write, selinux_perf_event_write),
+#endif
};
static __init int selinux_init(void)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 32e9b03be3dd..7db24855e12d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -244,6 +244,8 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
{"map_create", "map_read", "map_write", "prog_load", "prog_run"} },
{ "xdp_socket",
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "perf_event",
+ {"open", "cpu", "kernel", "tracepoint", "read", "write"} },
{ NULL }
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 586b7abd0aa7..a4a86cbcfb0a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -141,7 +141,11 @@ struct pkey_security_struct {
};
struct bpf_security_struct {
- u32 sid; /*SID of bpf obj creater*/
+ u32 sid; /* SID of bpf obj creator */
+};
+
+struct perf_event_security_struct {
+ u32 sid; /* SID of perf_event obj creator */
};
extern struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes;
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
index a9731f8a480f..2e8a30f06c74 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@
#define SVM_EXIT_MWAIT 0x08b
#define SVM_EXIT_MWAIT_COND 0x08c
#define SVM_EXIT_XSETBV 0x08d
+#define SVM_EXIT_RDPRU 0x08e
#define SVM_EXIT_NPF 0x400
#define SVM_EXIT_AVIC_INCOMPLETE_IPI 0x401
#define SVM_EXIT_AVIC_UNACCELERATED_ACCESS 0x402
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h
index f01950aa7fae..3eb8411ab60e 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h
@@ -86,6 +86,8 @@
#define EXIT_REASON_PML_FULL 62
#define EXIT_REASON_XSAVES 63
#define EXIT_REASON_XRSTORS 64
+#define EXIT_REASON_UMWAIT 67
+#define EXIT_REASON_TPAUSE 68
#define VMX_EXIT_REASONS \
{ EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI, "EXCEPTION_NMI" }, \
@@ -144,7 +146,9 @@
{ EXIT_REASON_RDSEED, "RDSEED" }, \
{ EXIT_REASON_PML_FULL, "PML_FULL" }, \
{ EXIT_REASON_XSAVES, "XSAVES" }, \
- { EXIT_REASON_XRSTORS, "XRSTORS" }
+ { EXIT_REASON_XRSTORS, "XRSTORS" }, \
+ { EXIT_REASON_UMWAIT, "UMWAIT" }, \
+ { EXIT_REASON_TPAUSE, "TPAUSE" }
#define VMX_ABORT_SAVE_GUEST_MSR_FAIL 1
#define VMX_ABORT_LOAD_HOST_PDPTE_FAIL 2
diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
index 233efbb1c81c..52641d8ca9e8 100644
--- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
+++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
@@ -999,6 +999,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt {
#define KVM_CAP_ARM_PTRAUTH_GENERIC 172
#define KVM_CAP_PMU_EVENT_FILTER 173
#define KVM_CAP_ARM_IRQ_LINE_LAYOUT_2 174
+#define KVM_CAP_HYPERV_DIRECT_TLBFLUSH 175
#ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING
@@ -1145,6 +1146,7 @@ struct kvm_dirty_tlb {
#define KVM_REG_S390 0x5000000000000000ULL
#define KVM_REG_ARM64 0x6000000000000000ULL
#define KVM_REG_MIPS 0x7000000000000000ULL
+#define KVM_REG_RISCV 0x8000000000000000ULL
#define KVM_REG_SIZE_SHIFT 52
#define KVM_REG_SIZE_MASK 0x00f0000000000000ULL
diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/sched.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/sched.h
index b3105ac1381a..99335e1f4a27 100644
--- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/sched.h
+++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/sched.h
@@ -33,8 +33,31 @@
#define CLONE_NEWNET 0x40000000 /* New network namespace */
#define CLONE_IO 0x80000000 /* Clone io context */
-/*
- * Arguments for the clone3 syscall
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+/**
+ * struct clone_args - arguments for the clone3 syscall
+ * @flags: Flags for the new process as listed above.
+ * All flags are valid except for CSIGNAL and
+ * CLONE_DETACHED.
+ * @pidfd: If CLONE_PIDFD is set, a pidfd will be
+ * returned in this argument.
+ * @child_tid: If CLONE_CHILD_SETTID is set, the TID of the
+ * child process will be returned in the child's
+ * memory.
+ * @parent_tid: If CLONE_PARENT_SETTID is set, the TID of
+ * the child process will be returned in the
+ * parent's memory.
+ * @exit_signal: The exit_signal the parent process will be
+ * sent when the child exits.
+ * @stack: Specify the location of the stack for the
+ * child process.
+ * @stack_size: The size of the stack for the child process.
+ * @tls: If CLONE_SETTLS is set, the tls descriptor
+ * is set to tls.
+ *
+ * The structure is versioned by size and thus extensible.
+ * New struct members must go at the end of the struct and
+ * must be properly 64bit aligned.
*/
struct clone_args {
__aligned_u64 flags;
@@ -46,6 +69,9 @@ struct clone_args {
__aligned_u64 stack_size;
__aligned_u64 tls;
};
+#endif
+
+#define CLONE_ARGS_SIZE_VER0 64 /* sizeof first published struct */
/*
* Scheduling policies
diff --git a/tools/perf/builtin-c2c.c b/tools/perf/builtin-c2c.c
index 3542b6ab9813..e69f44941aad 100644
--- a/tools/perf/builtin-c2c.c
+++ b/tools/perf/builtin-c2c.c
@@ -2635,6 +2635,7 @@ static int build_cl_output(char *cl_sort, bool no_source)
bool add_sym = false;
bool add_dso = false;
bool add_src = false;
+ int ret = 0;
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -2653,7 +2654,8 @@ static int build_cl_output(char *cl_sort, bool no_source)
add_dso = true;
} else if (strcmp(tok, "offset")) {
pr_err("unrecognized sort token: %s\n", tok);
- return -EINVAL;
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto err;
}
}
@@ -2676,13 +2678,15 @@ static int build_cl_output(char *cl_sort, bool no_source)
add_sym ? "symbol," : "",
add_dso ? "dso," : "",
add_src ? "cl_srcline," : "",
- "node") < 0)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ "node") < 0) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err;
+ }
c2c.show_src = add_src;
-
+err:
free(buf);
- return 0;
+ return ret;
}
static int setup_coalesce(const char *coalesce, bool no_source)
diff --git a/tools/perf/builtin-kmem.c b/tools/perf/builtin-kmem.c
index 1e61e353f579..9661671cc26e 100644
--- a/tools/perf/builtin-kmem.c
+++ b/tools/perf/builtin-kmem.c
@@ -691,6 +691,7 @@ static char *compact_gfp_flags(char *gfp_flags)
new = realloc(new_flags, len + strlen(cpt) + 2);
if (new == NULL) {
free(new_flags);
+ free(orig_flags);
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/annotate.c b/tools/perf/util/annotate.c
index eef8aa87db66..ef1866a902c4 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/annotate.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/annotate.c
@@ -1744,7 +1744,7 @@ static int symbol__disassemble_bpf(struct symbol *sym,
info_node = perf_env__find_bpf_prog_info(dso->bpf_prog.env,
dso->bpf_prog.id);
if (!info_node) {
- return SYMBOL_ANNOTATE_ERRNO__BPF_MISSING_BTF;
+ ret = SYMBOL_ANNOTATE_ERRNO__BPF_MISSING_BTF;
goto out;
}
info_linear = info_node->info_linear;
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/copyfile.c b/tools/perf/util/copyfile.c
index 3fa0db136667..47e03de7c235 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/copyfile.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/copyfile.c
@@ -101,14 +101,16 @@ static int copyfile_mode_ns(const char *from, const char *to, mode_t mode,
if (tofd < 0)
goto out;
- if (fchmod(tofd, mode))
- goto out_close_to;
-
if (st.st_size == 0) { /* /proc? do it slowly... */
err = slow_copyfile(from, tmp, nsi);
+ if (!err && fchmod(tofd, mode))
+ err = -1;
goto out_close_to;
}
+ if (fchmod(tofd, mode))
+ goto out_close_to;
+
nsinfo__mountns_enter(nsi, &nsc);
fromfd = open(from, O_RDONLY);
nsinfo__mountns_exit(&nsc);
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/header.c b/tools/perf/util/header.c
index 86d9396cb131..becc2d109423 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/header.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/header.c
@@ -1296,8 +1296,10 @@ static int build_mem_topology(struct memory_node *nodes, u64 size, u64 *cntp)
continue;
if (WARN_ONCE(cnt >= size,
- "failed to write MEM_TOPOLOGY, way too many nodes\n"))
+ "failed to write MEM_TOPOLOGY, way too many nodes\n")) {
+ closedir(dir);
return -1;
+ }
ret = memory_node__read(&nodes[cnt++], idx);
}
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/util.c b/tools/perf/util/util.c
index 5eda6e19c947..ae56c766eda1 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/util.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/util.c
@@ -154,8 +154,10 @@ static int rm_rf_depth_pat(const char *path, int depth, const char **pat)
if (!strcmp(d->d_name, ".") || !strcmp(d->d_name, ".."))
continue;
- if (!match_pat(d->d_name, pat))
- return -2;
+ if (!match_pat(d->d_name, pat)) {
+ ret = -2;
+ break;
+ }
scnprintf(namebuf, sizeof(namebuf), "%s/%s",
path, d->d_name);
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.46.0) at 2025-07-30 02:52:39 +0000