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-rw-r--r--Documentation/dev-tools/checkpatch.rst755
-rw-r--r--Documentation/dev-tools/gcov.rst8
-rw-r--r--Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst5
-rw-r--r--Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst354
-rw-r--r--Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst3
-rw-r--r--Documentation/dev-tools/kselftest.rst4
-rw-r--r--Documentation/dev-tools/kunit/tips.rst78
-rw-r--r--Documentation/dev-tools/testing-overview.rst117
8 files changed, 1166 insertions, 158 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/checkpatch.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/checkpatch.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..51fed1bd72ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/checkpatch.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,755 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+
+==========
+Checkpatch
+==========
+
+Checkpatch (scripts/checkpatch.pl) is a perl script which checks for trivial
+style violations in patches and optionally corrects them. Checkpatch can
+also be run on file contexts and without the kernel tree.
+
+Checkpatch is not always right. Your judgement takes precedence over checkpatch
+messages. If your code looks better with the violations, then its probably
+best left alone.
+
+
+Options
+=======
+
+This section will describe the options checkpatch can be run with.
+
+Usage::
+
+ ./scripts/checkpatch.pl [OPTION]... [FILE]...
+
+Available options:
+
+ - -q, --quiet
+
+ Enable quiet mode.
+
+ - -v, --verbose
+ Enable verbose mode. Additional verbose test descriptions are output
+ so as to provide information on why that particular message is shown.
+
+ - --no-tree
+
+ Run checkpatch without the kernel tree.
+
+ - --no-signoff
+
+ Disable the 'Signed-off-by' line check. The sign-off is a simple line at
+ the end of the explanation for the patch, which certifies that you wrote it
+ or otherwise have the right to pass it on as an open-source patch.
+
+ Example::
+
+ Signed-off-by: Random J Developer <random@developer.example.org>
+
+ Setting this flag effectively stops a message for a missing signed-off-by
+ line in a patch context.
+
+ - --patch
+
+ Treat FILE as a patch. This is the default option and need not be
+ explicitly specified.
+
+ - --emacs
+
+ Set output to emacs compile window format. This allows emacs users to jump
+ from the error in the compile window directly to the offending line in the
+ patch.
+
+ - --terse
+
+ Output only one line per report.
+
+ - --showfile
+
+ Show the diffed file position instead of the input file position.
+
+ - -g, --git
+
+ Treat FILE as a single commit or a git revision range.
+
+ Single commit with:
+
+ - <rev>
+ - <rev>^
+ - <rev>~n
+
+ Multiple commits with:
+
+ - <rev1>..<rev2>
+ - <rev1>...<rev2>
+ - <rev>-<count>
+
+ - -f, --file
+
+ Treat FILE as a regular source file. This option must be used when running
+ checkpatch on source files in the kernel.
+
+ - --subjective, --strict
+
+ Enable stricter tests in checkpatch. By default the tests emitted as CHECK
+ do not activate by default. Use this flag to activate the CHECK tests.
+
+ - --list-types
+
+ Every message emitted by checkpatch has an associated TYPE. Add this flag
+ to display all the types in checkpatch.
+
+ Note that when this flag is active, checkpatch does not read the input FILE,
+ and no message is emitted. Only a list of types in checkpatch is output.
+
+ - --types TYPE(,TYPE2...)
+
+ Only display messages with the given types.
+
+ Example::
+
+ ./scripts/checkpatch.pl mypatch.patch --types EMAIL_SUBJECT,BRACES
+
+ - --ignore TYPE(,TYPE2...)
+
+ Checkpatch will not emit messages for the specified types.
+
+ Example::
+
+ ./scripts/checkpatch.pl mypatch.patch --ignore EMAIL_SUBJECT,BRACES
+
+ - --show-types
+
+ By default checkpatch doesn't display the type associated with the messages.
+ Set this flag to show the message type in the output.
+
+ - --max-line-length=n
+
+ Set the max line length (default 100). If a line exceeds the specified
+ length, a LONG_LINE message is emitted.
+
+
+ The message level is different for patch and file contexts. For patches,
+ a WARNING is emitted. While a milder CHECK is emitted for files. So for
+ file contexts, the --strict flag must also be enabled.
+
+ - --min-conf-desc-length=n
+
+ Set the Kconfig entry minimum description length, if shorter, warn.
+
+ - --tab-size=n
+
+ Set the number of spaces for tab (default 8).
+
+ - --root=PATH
+
+ PATH to the kernel tree root.
+
+ This option must be specified when invoking checkpatch from outside
+ the kernel root.
+
+ - --no-summary
+
+ Suppress the per file summary.
+
+ - --mailback
+
+ Only produce a report in case of Warnings or Errors. Milder Checks are
+ excluded from this.
+
+ - --summary-file
+
+ Include the filename in summary.
+
+ - --debug KEY=[0|1]
+
+ Turn on/off debugging of KEY, where KEY is one of 'values', 'possible',
+ 'type', and 'attr' (default is all off).
+
+ - --fix
+
+ This is an EXPERIMENTAL feature. If correctable errors exists, a file
+ <inputfile>.EXPERIMENTAL-checkpatch-fixes is created which has the
+ automatically fixable errors corrected.
+
+ - --fix-inplace
+
+ EXPERIMENTAL - Similar to --fix but input file is overwritten with fixes.
+
+ DO NOT USE this flag unless you are absolutely sure and you have a backup
+ in place.
+
+ - --ignore-perl-version
+
+ Override checking of perl version. Runtime errors maybe encountered after
+ enabling this flag if the perl version does not meet the minimum specified.
+
+ - --codespell
+
+ Use the codespell dictionary for checking spelling errors.
+
+ - --codespellfile
+
+ Use the specified codespell file.
+ Default is '/usr/share/codespell/dictionary.txt'.
+
+ - --typedefsfile
+
+ Read additional types from this file.
+
+ - --color[=WHEN]
+
+ Use colors 'always', 'never', or only when output is a terminal ('auto').
+ Default is 'auto'.
+
+ - --kconfig-prefix=WORD
+
+ Use WORD as a prefix for Kconfig symbols (default is `CONFIG_`).
+
+ - -h, --help, --version
+
+ Display the help text.
+
+Message Levels
+==============
+
+Messages in checkpatch are divided into three levels. The levels of messages
+in checkpatch denote the severity of the error. They are:
+
+ - ERROR
+
+ This is the most strict level. Messages of type ERROR must be taken
+ seriously as they denote things that are very likely to be wrong.
+
+ - WARNING
+
+ This is the next stricter level. Messages of type WARNING requires a
+ more careful review. But it is milder than an ERROR.
+
+ - CHECK
+
+ This is the mildest level. These are things which may require some thought.
+
+Type Descriptions
+=================
+
+This section contains a description of all the message types in checkpatch.
+
+.. Types in this section are also parsed by checkpatch.
+.. The types are grouped into subsections based on use.
+
+
+Allocation style
+----------------
+
+ **ALLOC_ARRAY_ARGS**
+ The first argument for kcalloc or kmalloc_array should be the
+ number of elements. sizeof() as the first argument is generally
+ wrong.
+ See: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/core-api/memory-allocation.html
+
+ **ALLOC_SIZEOF_STRUCT**
+ The allocation style is bad. In general for family of
+ allocation functions using sizeof() to get memory size,
+ constructs like::
+
+ p = alloc(sizeof(struct foo), ...)
+
+ should be::
+
+ p = alloc(sizeof(*p), ...)
+
+ See: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/coding-style.html#allocating-memory
+
+ **ALLOC_WITH_MULTIPLY**
+ Prefer kmalloc_array/kcalloc over kmalloc/kzalloc with a
+ sizeof multiply.
+ See: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/core-api/memory-allocation.html
+
+
+API usage
+---------
+
+ **ARCH_DEFINES**
+ Architecture specific defines should be avoided wherever
+ possible.
+
+ **ARCH_INCLUDE_LINUX**
+ Whenever asm/file.h is included and linux/file.h exists, a
+ conversion can be made when linux/file.h includes asm/file.h.
+ However this is not always the case (See signal.h).
+ This message type is emitted only for includes from arch/.
+
+ **AVOID_BUG**
+ BUG() or BUG_ON() should be avoided totally.
+ Use WARN() and WARN_ON() instead, and handle the "impossible"
+ error condition as gracefully as possible.
+ See: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html#bug-and-bug-on
+
+ **CONSIDER_KSTRTO**
+ The simple_strtol(), simple_strtoll(), simple_strtoul(), and
+ simple_strtoull() functions explicitly ignore overflows, which
+ may lead to unexpected results in callers. The respective kstrtol(),
+ kstrtoll(), kstrtoul(), and kstrtoull() functions tend to be the
+ correct replacements.
+ See: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html#simple-strtol-simple-strtoll-simple-strtoul-simple-strtoull
+
+ **LOCKDEP**
+ The lockdep_no_validate class was added as a temporary measure to
+ prevent warnings on conversion of device->sem to device->mutex.
+ It should not be used for any other purpose.
+ See: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1268959062.9440.467.camel@laptop/
+
+ **MALFORMED_INCLUDE**
+ The #include statement has a malformed path. This has happened
+ because the author has included a double slash "//" in the pathname
+ accidentally.
+
+ **USE_LOCKDEP**
+ lockdep_assert_held() annotations should be preferred over
+ assertions based on spin_is_locked()
+ See: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/locking/lockdep-design.html#annotations
+
+ **UAPI_INCLUDE**
+ No #include statements in include/uapi should use a uapi/ path.
+
+
+Comment style
+-------------
+
+ **BLOCK_COMMENT_STYLE**
+ The comment style is incorrect. The preferred style for multi-
+ line comments is::
+
+ /*
+ * This is the preferred style
+ * for multi line comments.
+ */
+
+ The networking comment style is a bit different, with the first line
+ not empty like the former::
+
+ /* This is the preferred comment style
+ * for files in net/ and drivers/net/
+ */
+
+ See: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/coding-style.html#commenting
+
+ **C99_COMMENTS**
+ C99 style single line comments (//) should not be used.
+ Prefer the block comment style instead.
+ See: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/coding-style.html#commenting
+
+
+Commit message
+--------------
+
+ **BAD_SIGN_OFF**
+ The signed-off-by line does not fall in line with the standards
+ specified by the community.
+ See: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/submitting-patches.html#developer-s-certificate-of-origin-1-1
+
+ **BAD_STABLE_ADDRESS_STYLE**
+ The email format for stable is incorrect.
+ Some valid options for stable address are::
+
+ 1. stable@vger.kernel.org
+ 2. stable@kernel.org
+
+ For adding version info, the following comment style should be used::
+
+ stable@vger.kernel.org # version info
+
+ **COMMIT_COMMENT_SYMBOL**
+ Commit log lines starting with a '#' are ignored by git as
+ comments. To solve this problem addition of a single space
+ infront of the log line is enough.
+
+ **COMMIT_MESSAGE**
+ The patch is missing a commit description. A brief
+ description of the changes made by the patch should be added.
+ See: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/submitting-patches.html#describe-your-changes
+
+ **MISSING_SIGN_OFF**
+ The patch is missing a Signed-off-by line. A signed-off-by
+ line should be added according to Developer's certificate of
+ Origin.
+ See: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/submitting-patches.html#sign-your-work-the-developer-s-certificate-of-origin
+
+ **NO_AUTHOR_SIGN_OFF**
+ The author of the patch has not signed off the patch. It is
+ required that a simple sign off line should be present at the
+ end of explanation of the patch to denote that the author has
+ written it or otherwise has the rights to pass it on as an open
+ source patch.
+ See: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/submitting-patches.html#sign-your-work-the-developer-s-certificate-of-origin
+
+ **DIFF_IN_COMMIT_MSG**
+ Avoid having diff content in commit message.
+ This causes problems when one tries to apply a file containing both
+ the changelog and the diff because patch(1) tries to apply the diff
+ which it found in the changelog.
+ See: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20150611134006.9df79a893e3636019ad2759e@linux-foundation.org/
+
+ **GERRIT_CHANGE_ID**
+ To be picked up by gerrit, the footer of the commit message might
+ have a Change-Id like::
+
+ Change-Id: Ic8aaa0728a43936cd4c6e1ed590e01ba8f0fbf5b
+ Signed-off-by: A. U. Thor <author@example.com>
+
+ The Change-Id line must be removed before submitting.
+
+ **GIT_COMMIT_ID**
+ The proper way to reference a commit id is:
+ commit <12+ chars of sha1> ("<title line>")
+
+ An example may be::
+
+ Commit e21d2170f36602ae2708 ("video: remove unnecessary
+ platform_set_drvdata()") removed the unnecessary
+ platform_set_drvdata(), but left the variable "dev" unused,
+ delete it.
+
+ See: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/submitting-patches.html#describe-your-changes
+
+
+Comparison style
+----------------
+
+ **ASSIGN_IN_IF**
+ Do not use assignments in if condition.
+ Example::
+
+ if ((foo = bar(...)) < BAZ) {
+
+ should be written as::
+
+ foo = bar(...);
+ if (foo < BAZ) {
+
+ **BOOL_COMPARISON**
+ Comparisons of A to true and false are better written
+ as A and !A.
+ See: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1365563834.27174.12.camel@joe-AO722/
+
+ **COMPARISON_TO_NULL**
+ Comparisons to NULL in the form (foo == NULL) or (foo != NULL)
+ are better written as (!foo) and (foo).
+
+ **CONSTANT_COMPARISON**
+ Comparisons with a constant or upper case identifier on the left
+ side of the test should be avoided.
+
+
+Macros, Attributes and Symbols
+------------------------------
+
+ **ARRAY_SIZE**
+ The ARRAY_SIZE(foo) macro should be preferred over
+ sizeof(foo)/sizeof(foo[0]) for finding number of elements in an
+ array.
+
+ The macro is defined in include/linux/kernel.h::
+
+ #define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof((x)[0]))
+
+ **AVOID_EXTERNS**
+ Function prototypes don't need to be declared extern in .h
+ files. It's assumed by the compiler and is unnecessary.
+
+ **AVOID_L_PREFIX**
+ Local symbol names that are prefixed with `.L` should be avoided,
+ as this has special meaning for the assembler; a symbol entry will
+ not be emitted into the symbol table. This can prevent `objtool`
+ from generating correct unwind info.
+
+ Symbols with STB_LOCAL binding may still be used, and `.L` prefixed
+ local symbol names are still generally usable within a function,
+ but `.L` prefixed local symbol names should not be used to denote
+ the beginning or end of code regions via
+ `SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL`/`SYM_CODE_END`
+
+ **BIT_MACRO**
+ Defines like: 1 << <digit> could be BIT(digit).
+ The BIT() macro is defined in include/linux/bitops.h::
+
+ #define BIT(nr) (1UL << (nr))
+
+ **CONST_READ_MOSTLY**
+ When a variable is tagged with the __read_mostly annotation, it is a
+ signal to the compiler that accesses to the variable will be mostly
+ reads and rarely(but NOT never) a write.
+
+ const __read_mostly does not make any sense as const data is already
+ read-only. The __read_mostly annotation thus should be removed.
+
+ **DATE_TIME**
+ It is generally desirable that building the same source code with
+ the same set of tools is reproducible, i.e. the output is always
+ exactly the same.
+
+ The kernel does *not* use the ``__DATE__`` and ``__TIME__`` macros,
+ and enables warnings if they are used as they can lead to
+ non-deterministic builds.
+ See: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/kbuild/reproducible-builds.html#timestamps
+
+ **DEFINE_ARCH_HAS**
+ The ARCH_HAS_xyz and ARCH_HAVE_xyz patterns are wrong.
+
+ For big conceptual features use Kconfig symbols instead. And for
+ smaller things where we have compatibility fallback functions but
+ want architectures able to override them with optimized ones, we
+ should either use weak functions (appropriate for some cases), or
+ the symbol that protects them should be the same symbol we use.
+ See: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFycQ9XJvEOsiM3txHL5bjUc8CeKWJNR_H+MiicaddB42Q@mail.gmail.com/
+
+ **INIT_ATTRIBUTE**
+ Const init definitions should use __initconst instead of
+ __initdata.
+
+ Similarly init definitions without const require a separate
+ use of const.
+
+ **INLINE_LOCATION**
+ The inline keyword should sit between storage class and type.
+
+ For example, the following segment::
+
+ inline static int example_function(void)
+ {
+ ...
+ }
+
+ should be::
+
+ static inline int example_function(void)
+ {
+ ...
+ }
+
+ **MULTISTATEMENT_MACRO_USE_DO_WHILE**
+ Macros with multiple statements should be enclosed in a
+ do - while block. Same should also be the case for macros
+ starting with `if` to avoid logic defects::
+
+ #define macrofun(a, b, c) \
+ do { \
+ if (a == 5) \
+ do_this(b, c); \
+ } while (0)
+
+ See: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/coding-style.html#macros-enums-and-rtl
+
+ **WEAK_DECLARATION**
+ Using weak declarations like __attribute__((weak)) or __weak
+ can have unintended link defects. Avoid using them.
+
+
+Functions and Variables
+-----------------------
+
+ **CAMELCASE**
+ Avoid CamelCase Identifiers.
+ See: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/coding-style.html#naming
+
+ **FUNCTION_WITHOUT_ARGS**
+ Function declarations without arguments like::
+
+ int foo()
+
+ should be::
+
+ int foo(void)
+
+ **GLOBAL_INITIALISERS**
+ Global variables should not be initialized explicitly to
+ 0 (or NULL, false, etc.). Your compiler (or rather your
+ loader, which is responsible for zeroing out the relevant
+ sections) automatically does it for you.
+
+ **INITIALISED_STATIC**
+ Static variables should not be initialized explicitly to zero.
+ Your compiler (or rather your loader) automatically does
+ it for you.
+
+ **RETURN_PARENTHESES**
+ return is not a function and as such doesn't need parentheses::
+
+ return (bar);
+
+ can simply be::
+
+ return bar;
+
+
+Spacing and Brackets
+--------------------
+
+ **ASSIGNMENT_CONTINUATIONS**
+ Assignment operators should not be written at the start of a
+ line but should follow the operand at the previous line.
+
+ **BRACES**
+ The placement of braces is stylistically incorrect.
+ The preferred way is to put the opening brace last on the line,
+ and put the closing brace first::
+
+ if (x is true) {
+ we do y
+ }
+
+ This applies for all non-functional blocks.
+ However, there is one special case, namely functions: they have the
+ opening brace at the beginning of the next line, thus::
+
+ int function(int x)
+ {
+ body of function
+ }
+
+ See: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/coding-style.html#placing-braces-and-spaces
+
+ **BRACKET_SPACE**
+ Whitespace before opening bracket '[' is prohibited.
+ There are some exceptions:
+
+ 1. With a type on the left::
+
+ ;int [] a;
+
+ 2. At the beginning of a line for slice initialisers::
+
+ [0...10] = 5,
+
+ 3. Inside a curly brace::
+
+ = { [0...10] = 5 }
+
+ **CODE_INDENT**
+ Code indent should use tabs instead of spaces.
+ Outside of comments, documentation and Kconfig,
+ spaces are never used for indentation.
+ See: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/coding-style.html#indentation
+
+ **CONCATENATED_STRING**
+ Concatenated elements should have a space in between.
+ Example::
+
+ printk(KERN_INFO"bar");
+
+ should be::
+
+ printk(KERN_INFO "bar");
+
+ **ELSE_AFTER_BRACE**
+ `else {` should follow the closing block `}` on the same line.
+ See: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/coding-style.html#placing-braces-and-spaces
+
+ **LINE_SPACING**
+ Vertical space is wasted given the limited number of lines an
+ editor window can display when multiple blank lines are used.
+ See: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/coding-style.html#spaces
+
+ **OPEN_BRACE**
+ The opening brace should be following the function definitions on the
+ next line. For any non-functional block it should be on the same line
+ as the last construct.
+ See: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/coding-style.html#placing-braces-and-spaces
+
+ **POINTER_LOCATION**
+ When using pointer data or a function that returns a pointer type,
+ the preferred use of * is adjacent to the data name or function name
+ and not adjacent to the type name.
+ Examples::
+
+ char *linux_banner;
+ unsigned long long memparse(char *ptr, char **retptr);
+ char *match_strdup(substring_t *s);
+
+ See: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/coding-style.html#spaces
+
+ **SPACING**
+ Whitespace style used in the kernel sources is described in kernel docs.
+ See: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/coding-style.html#spaces
+
+ **SWITCH_CASE_INDENT_LEVEL**
+ switch should be at the same indent as case.
+ Example::
+
+ switch (suffix) {
+ case 'G':
+ case 'g':
+ mem <<= 30;
+ break;
+ case 'M':
+ case 'm':
+ mem <<= 20;
+ break;
+ case 'K':
+ case 'k':
+ mem <<= 10;
+ /* fall through */
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ See: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/coding-style.html#indentation
+
+ **TRAILING_WHITESPACE**
+ Trailing whitespace should always be removed.
+ Some editors highlight the trailing whitespace and cause visual
+ distractions when editing files.
+ See: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/coding-style.html#spaces
+
+ **WHILE_AFTER_BRACE**
+ while should follow the closing bracket on the same line::
+
+ do {
+ ...
+ } while(something);
+
+ See: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/coding-style.html#placing-braces-and-spaces
+
+
+Others
+------
+
+ **CONFIG_DESCRIPTION**
+ Kconfig symbols should have a help text which fully describes
+ it.
+
+ **CORRUPTED_PATCH**
+ The patch seems to be corrupted or lines are wrapped.
+ Please regenerate the patch file before sending it to the maintainer.
+
+ **DOS_LINE_ENDINGS**
+ For DOS-formatted patches, there are extra ^M symbols at the end of
+ the line. These should be removed.
+
+ **EXECUTE_PERMISSIONS**
+ There is no reason for source files to be executable. The executable
+ bit can be removed safely.
+
+ **NON_OCTAL_PERMISSIONS**
+ Permission bits should use 4 digit octal permissions (like 0700 or 0444).
+ Avoid using any other base like decimal.
+
+ **NOT_UNIFIED_DIFF**
+ The patch file does not appear to be in unified-diff format. Please
+ regenerate the patch file before sending it to the maintainer.
+
+ **PRINTF_0XDECIMAL**
+ Prefixing 0x with decimal output is defective and should be corrected.
+
+ **TRAILING_STATEMENTS**
+ Trailing statements (for example after any conditional) should be
+ on the next line.
+ Like::
+
+ if (x == y) break;
+
+ should be::
+
+ if (x == y)
+ break;
diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/gcov.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/gcov.rst
index 9e989baae154..5fce2b06f229 100644
--- a/Documentation/dev-tools/gcov.rst
+++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/gcov.rst
@@ -124,6 +124,8 @@ box for setups where kernels are built and run on the same machine. In
cases where the kernel runs on a separate machine, special preparations
must be made, depending on where the gcov tool is used:
+.. _gcov-test:
+
a) gcov is run on the TEST machine
The gcov tool version on the test machine must be compatible with the
@@ -143,6 +145,8 @@ a) gcov is run on the TEST machine
machine. If any of the path components is symbolic link, the actual
directory needs to be used instead (due to make's CURDIR handling).
+.. _gcov-build:
+
b) gcov is run on the BUILD machine
The following files need to be copied after each test case from test
@@ -211,7 +215,7 @@ Appendix A: gather_on_build.sh
------------------------------
Sample script to gather coverage meta files on the build machine
-(see 6a):
+(see :ref:`Separated build and test machines a. <gcov-test>`):
.. code-block:: sh
@@ -244,7 +248,7 @@ Appendix B: gather_on_test.sh
-----------------------------
Sample script to gather coverage data files on the test machine
-(see 6b):
+(see :ref:`Separated build and test machines b. <gcov-build>`):
.. code-block:: sh
diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst
index 1b1cf4f5c9d9..010a2af1e7d9 100644
--- a/Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst
@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ be used to work on the kernel. For now, the documents have been pulled
together without any significant effort to integrate them into a coherent
whole; patches welcome!
+A brief overview of testing-specific tools can be found in
+Documentation/dev-tools/testing-overview.rst
+
.. class:: toc-title
Table of contents
@@ -14,6 +17,8 @@ whole; patches welcome!
.. toctree::
:maxdepth: 2
+ testing-overview
+ checkpatch
coccinelle
sparse
kcov
diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst
index ddf4239a5890..d3f335ffc751 100644
--- a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst
+++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst
@@ -11,46 +11,56 @@ designed to find out-of-bound and use-after-free bugs. KASAN has three modes:
2. software tag-based KASAN (similar to userspace HWASan),
3. hardware tag-based KASAN (based on hardware memory tagging).
-Software KASAN modes (1 and 2) use compile-time instrumentation to insert
-validity checks before every memory access, and therefore require a compiler
+Generic KASAN is mainly used for debugging due to a large memory overhead.
+Software tag-based KASAN can be used for dogfood testing as it has a lower
+memory overhead that allows using it with real workloads. Hardware tag-based
+KASAN comes with low memory and performance overheads and, therefore, can be
+used in production. Either as an in-field memory bug detector or as a security
+mitigation.
+
+Software KASAN modes (#1 and #2) use compile-time instrumentation to insert
+validity checks before every memory access and, therefore, require a compiler
version that supports that.
-Generic KASAN is supported in both GCC and Clang. With GCC it requires version
+Generic KASAN is supported in GCC and Clang. With GCC, it requires version
8.3.0 or later. Any supported Clang version is compatible, but detection of
out-of-bounds accesses for global variables is only supported since Clang 11.
-Tag-based KASAN is only supported in Clang.
+Software tag-based KASAN mode is only supported in Clang.
-Currently generic KASAN is supported for the x86_64, arm, arm64, xtensa, s390
+The hardware KASAN mode (#3) relies on hardware to perform the checks but
+still requires a compiler version that supports memory tagging instructions.
+This mode is supported in GCC 10+ and Clang 11+.
+
+Both software KASAN modes work with SLUB and SLAB memory allocators,
+while the hardware tag-based KASAN currently only supports SLUB.
+
+Currently, generic KASAN is supported for the x86_64, arm, arm64, xtensa, s390,
and riscv architectures, and tag-based KASAN modes are supported only for arm64.
Usage
-----
-To enable KASAN configure kernel with::
-
- CONFIG_KASAN = y
-
-and choose between CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC (to enable generic KASAN),
-CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS (to enable software tag-based KASAN), and
-CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS (to enable hardware tag-based KASAN).
+To enable KASAN, configure the kernel with::
-For software modes, you also need to choose between CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE and
-CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE. Outline and inline are compiler instrumentation types.
-The former produces smaller binary while the latter is 1.1 - 2 times faster.
+ CONFIG_KASAN=y
-Both software KASAN modes work with both SLUB and SLAB memory allocators,
-while the hardware tag-based KASAN currently only support SLUB.
+and choose between ``CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC`` (to enable generic KASAN),
+``CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS`` (to enable software tag-based KASAN), and
+``CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS`` (to enable hardware tag-based KASAN).
-For better error reports that include stack traces, enable CONFIG_STACKTRACE.
+For software modes, also choose between ``CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE`` and
+``CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE``. Outline and inline are compiler instrumentation types.
+The former produces a smaller binary while the latter is 1.1-2 times faster.
-To augment reports with last allocation and freeing stack of the physical page,
-it is recommended to enable also CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER and boot with page_owner=on.
+To include alloc and free stack traces of affected slab objects into reports,
+enable ``CONFIG_STACKTRACE``. To include alloc and free stack traces of affected
+physical pages, enable ``CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER`` and boot with ``page_owner=on``.
Error reports
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-A typical out-of-bounds access generic KASAN report looks like this::
+A typical KASAN report looks like this::
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmalloc_oob_right+0xa8/0xbc [test_kasan]
@@ -123,68 +133,75 @@ A typical out-of-bounds access generic KASAN report looks like this::
ffff8801f44ec400: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
-The header of the report provides a short summary of what kind of bug happened
-and what kind of access caused it. It's followed by a stack trace of the bad
-access, a stack trace of where the accessed memory was allocated (in case bad
-access happens on a slab object), and a stack trace of where the object was
-freed (in case of a use-after-free bug report). Next comes a description of
-the accessed slab object and information about the accessed memory page.
+The report header summarizes what kind of bug happened and what kind of access
+caused it. It is followed by a stack trace of the bad access, a stack trace of
+where the accessed memory was allocated (in case a slab object was accessed),
+and a stack trace of where the object was freed (in case of a use-after-free
+bug report). Next comes a description of the accessed slab object and the
+information about the accessed memory page.
-In the last section the report shows memory state around the accessed address.
-Internally KASAN tracks memory state separately for each memory granule, which
+In the end, the report shows the memory state around the accessed address.
+Internally, KASAN tracks memory state separately for each memory granule, which
is either 8 or 16 aligned bytes depending on KASAN mode. Each number in the
memory state section of the report shows the state of one of the memory
granules that surround the accessed address.
-For generic KASAN the size of each memory granule is 8. The state of each
+For generic KASAN, the size of each memory granule is 8. The state of each
granule is encoded in one shadow byte. Those 8 bytes can be accessible,
-partially accessible, freed or be a part of a redzone. KASAN uses the following
-encoding for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes of the corresponding
+partially accessible, freed, or be a part of a redzone. KASAN uses the following
+encoding for each shadow byte: 00 means that all 8 bytes of the corresponding
memory region are accessible; number N (1 <= N <= 7) means that the first N
bytes are accessible, and other (8 - N) bytes are not; any negative value
indicates that the entire 8-byte word is inaccessible. KASAN uses different
negative values to distinguish between different kinds of inaccessible memory
like redzones or freed memory (see mm/kasan/kasan.h).
-In the report above the arrows point to the shadow byte 03, which means that
-the accessed address is partially accessible. For tag-based KASAN modes this
-last report section shows the memory tags around the accessed address
-(see the `Implementation details`_ section).
+In the report above, the arrow points to the shadow byte ``03``, which means
+that the accessed address is partially accessible.
+
+For tag-based KASAN modes, this last report section shows the memory tags around
+the accessed address (see the `Implementation details`_ section).
+
+Note that KASAN bug titles (like ``slab-out-of-bounds`` or ``use-after-free``)
+are best-effort: KASAN prints the most probable bug type based on the limited
+information it has. The actual type of the bug might be different.
+
+Generic KASAN also reports up to two auxiliary call stack traces. These stack
+traces point to places in code that interacted with the object but that are not
+directly present in the bad access stack trace. Currently, this includes
+call_rcu() and workqueue queuing.
Boot parameters
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+KASAN is affected by the generic ``panic_on_warn`` command line parameter.
+When it is enabled, KASAN panics the kernel after printing a bug report.
+
+By default, KASAN prints a bug report only for the first invalid memory access.
+With ``kasan_multi_shot``, KASAN prints a report on every invalid access. This
+effectively disables ``panic_on_warn`` for KASAN reports.
+
Hardware tag-based KASAN mode (see the section about various modes below) is
intended for use in production as a security mitigation. Therefore, it supports
-boot parameters that allow to disable KASAN competely or otherwise control
-particular KASAN features.
+boot parameters that allow disabling KASAN or controlling its features.
- ``kasan=off`` or ``=on`` controls whether KASAN is enabled (default: ``on``).
+- ``kasan.mode=sync`` or ``=async`` controls whether KASAN is configured in
+ synchronous or asynchronous mode of execution (default: ``sync``).
+ Synchronous mode: a bad access is detected immediately when a tag
+ check fault occurs.
+ Asynchronous mode: a bad access detection is delayed. When a tag check
+ fault occurs, the information is stored in hardware (in the TFSR_EL1
+ register for arm64). The kernel periodically checks the hardware and
+ only reports tag faults during these checks.
+
- ``kasan.stacktrace=off`` or ``=on`` disables or enables alloc and free stack
traces collection (default: ``on``).
- ``kasan.fault=report`` or ``=panic`` controls whether to only print a KASAN
- report or also panic the kernel (default: ``report``). Note, that tag
- checking gets disabled after the first reported bug.
-
-For developers
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-Software KASAN modes use compiler instrumentation to insert validity checks.
-Such instrumentation might be incompatible with some part of the kernel, and
-therefore needs to be disabled. To disable instrumentation for specific files
-or directories, add a line similar to the following to the respective kernel
-Makefile:
-
-- For a single file (e.g. main.o)::
-
- KASAN_SANITIZE_main.o := n
-
-- For all files in one directory::
-
- KASAN_SANITIZE := n
-
+ report or also panic the kernel (default: ``report``). The panic happens even
+ if ``kasan_multi_shot`` is enabled.
Implementation details
----------------------
@@ -192,12 +209,11 @@ Implementation details
Generic KASAN
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-From a high level perspective, KASAN's approach to memory error detection is
-similar to that of kmemcheck: use shadow memory to record whether each byte of
-memory is safe to access, and use compile-time instrumentation to insert checks
-of shadow memory on each memory access.
+Software KASAN modes use shadow memory to record whether each byte of memory is
+safe to access and use compile-time instrumentation to insert shadow memory
+checks before each memory access.
-Generic KASAN dedicates 1/8th of kernel memory to its shadow memory (e.g. 16TB
+Generic KASAN dedicates 1/8th of kernel memory to its shadow memory (16TB
to cover 128TB on x86_64) and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to
translate a memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
@@ -206,113 +222,105 @@ address::
static inline void *kasan_mem_to_shadow(const void *addr)
{
- return ((unsigned long)addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)
+ return (void *)((unsigned long)addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)
+ KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where ``KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3``.
Compile-time instrumentation is used to insert memory access checks. Compiler
-inserts function calls (__asan_load*(addr), __asan_store*(addr)) before each
-memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16. These functions check whether memory
-access is valid or not by checking corresponding shadow memory.
-
-GCC 5.0 has possibility to perform inline instrumentation. Instead of making
-function calls GCC directly inserts the code to check the shadow memory.
-This option significantly enlarges kernel but it gives x1.1-x2 performance
-boost over outline instrumented kernel.
+inserts function calls (``__asan_load*(addr)``, ``__asan_store*(addr)``) before
+each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8, or 16. These functions check whether
+memory accesses are valid or not by checking corresponding shadow memory.
-Generic KASAN also reports the last 2 call stacks to creation of work that
-potentially has access to an object. Call stacks for the following are shown:
-call_rcu() and workqueue queuing.
+With inline instrumentation, instead of making function calls, the compiler
+directly inserts the code to check shadow memory. This option significantly
+enlarges the kernel, but it gives an x1.1-x2 performance boost over the
+outline-instrumented kernel.
-Generic KASAN is the only mode that delays the reuse of freed object via
+Generic KASAN is the only mode that delays the reuse of freed objects via
quarantine (see mm/kasan/quarantine.c for implementation).
Software tag-based KASAN
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-Software tag-based KASAN requires software memory tagging support in the form
-of HWASan-like compiler instrumentation (see HWASan documentation for details).
-
-Software tag-based KASAN is currently only implemented for arm64 architecture.
+Software tag-based KASAN uses a software memory tagging approach to checking
+access validity. It is currently only implemented for the arm64 architecture.
Software tag-based KASAN uses the Top Byte Ignore (TBI) feature of arm64 CPUs
-to store a pointer tag in the top byte of kernel pointers. Like generic KASAN
-it uses shadow memory to store memory tags associated with each 16-byte memory
-cell (therefore it dedicates 1/16th of the kernel memory for shadow memory).
+to store a pointer tag in the top byte of kernel pointers. It uses shadow memory
+to store memory tags associated with each 16-byte memory cell (therefore, it
+dedicates 1/16th of the kernel memory for shadow memory).
-On each memory allocation software tag-based KASAN generates a random tag, tags
-the allocated memory with this tag, and embeds this tag into the returned
+On each memory allocation, software tag-based KASAN generates a random tag, tags
+the allocated memory with this tag, and embeds the same tag into the returned
pointer.
Software tag-based KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation to insert checks
-before each memory access. These checks make sure that tag of the memory that
-is being accessed is equal to tag of the pointer that is used to access this
-memory. In case of a tag mismatch software tag-based KASAN prints a bug report.
+before each memory access. These checks make sure that the tag of the memory
+that is being accessed is equal to the tag of the pointer that is used to access
+this memory. In case of a tag mismatch, software tag-based KASAN prints a bug
+report.
-Software tag-based KASAN also has two instrumentation modes (outline, that
-emits callbacks to check memory accesses; and inline, that performs the shadow
+Software tag-based KASAN also has two instrumentation modes (outline, which
+emits callbacks to check memory accesses; and inline, which performs the shadow
memory checks inline). With outline instrumentation mode, a bug report is
-simply printed from the function that performs the access check. With inline
-instrumentation a brk instruction is emitted by the compiler, and a dedicated
-brk handler is used to print bug reports.
+printed from the function that performs the access check. With inline
+instrumentation, a ``brk`` instruction is emitted by the compiler, and a
+dedicated ``brk`` handler is used to print bug reports.
Software tag-based KASAN uses 0xFF as a match-all pointer tag (accesses through
-pointers with 0xFF pointer tag aren't checked). The value 0xFE is currently
+pointers with the 0xFF pointer tag are not checked). The value 0xFE is currently
reserved to tag freed memory regions.
-Software tag-based KASAN currently only supports tagging of
-kmem_cache_alloc/kmalloc and page_alloc memory.
+Software tag-based KASAN currently only supports tagging of slab and page_alloc
+memory.
Hardware tag-based KASAN
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-Hardware tag-based KASAN is similar to the software mode in concept, but uses
+Hardware tag-based KASAN is similar to the software mode in concept but uses
hardware memory tagging support instead of compiler instrumentation and
shadow memory.
Hardware tag-based KASAN is currently only implemented for arm64 architecture
and based on both arm64 Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) introduced in ARMv8.5
-Instruction Set Architecture, and Top Byte Ignore (TBI).
+Instruction Set Architecture and Top Byte Ignore (TBI).
Special arm64 instructions are used to assign memory tags for each allocation.
Same tags are assigned to pointers to those allocations. On every memory
-access, hardware makes sure that tag of the memory that is being accessed is
-equal to tag of the pointer that is used to access this memory. In case of a
-tag mismatch a fault is generated and a report is printed.
+access, hardware makes sure that the tag of the memory that is being accessed is
+equal to the tag of the pointer that is used to access this memory. In case of a
+tag mismatch, a fault is generated, and a report is printed.
Hardware tag-based KASAN uses 0xFF as a match-all pointer tag (accesses through
-pointers with 0xFF pointer tag aren't checked). The value 0xFE is currently
+pointers with the 0xFF pointer tag are not checked). The value 0xFE is currently
reserved to tag freed memory regions.
-Hardware tag-based KASAN currently only supports tagging of
-kmem_cache_alloc/kmalloc and page_alloc memory.
+Hardware tag-based KASAN currently only supports tagging of slab and page_alloc
+memory.
-If the hardware doesn't support MTE (pre ARMv8.5), hardware tag-based KASAN
-won't be enabled. In this case all boot parameters are ignored.
+If the hardware does not support MTE (pre ARMv8.5), hardware tag-based KASAN
+will not be enabled. In this case, all KASAN boot parameters are ignored.
-Note, that enabling CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS always results in in-kernel TBI being
-enabled. Even when kasan.mode=off is provided, or when the hardware doesn't
+Note that enabling CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS always results in in-kernel TBI being
+enabled. Even when ``kasan.mode=off`` is provided or when the hardware does not
support MTE (but supports TBI).
-Hardware tag-based KASAN only reports the first found bug. After that MTE tag
+Hardware tag-based KASAN only reports the first found bug. After that, MTE tag
checking gets disabled.
-What memory accesses are sanitised by KASAN?
---------------------------------------------
+Shadow memory
+-------------
-The kernel maps memory in a number of different parts of the address
-space. This poses something of a problem for KASAN, which requires
-that all addresses accessed by instrumented code have a valid shadow
-region.
+The kernel maps memory in several different parts of the address space.
+The range of kernel virtual addresses is large: there is not enough real
+memory to support a real shadow region for every address that could be
+accessed by the kernel. Therefore, KASAN only maps real shadow for certain
+parts of the address space.
-The range of kernel virtual addresses is large: there is not enough
-real memory to support a real shadow region for every address that
-could be accessed by the kernel.
-
-By default
-~~~~~~~~~~
+Default behaviour
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
By default, architectures only map real memory over the shadow region
for the linear mapping (and potentially other small areas). For all
@@ -321,10 +329,9 @@ page is mapped over the shadow area. This read-only shadow page
declares all memory accesses as permitted.
This presents a problem for modules: they do not live in the linear
-mapping, but in a dedicated module space. By hooking in to the module
-allocator, KASAN can temporarily map real shadow memory to cover
-them. This allows detection of invalid accesses to module globals, for
-example.
+mapping but in a dedicated module space. By hooking into the module
+allocator, KASAN temporarily maps real shadow memory to cover them.
+This allows detection of invalid accesses to module globals, for example.
This also creates an incompatibility with ``VMAP_STACK``: if the stack
lives in vmalloc space, it will be shadowed by the read-only page, and
@@ -335,9 +342,10 @@ CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
With ``CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC``, KASAN can cover vmalloc space at the
-cost of greater memory usage. Currently this is only supported on x86.
+cost of greater memory usage. Currently, this is supported on x86,
+riscv, s390, and powerpc.
-This works by hooking into vmalloc and vmap, and dynamically
+This works by hooking into vmalloc and vmap and dynamically
allocating real shadow memory to back the mappings.
Most mappings in vmalloc space are small, requiring less than a full
@@ -356,28 +364,76 @@ memory.
To avoid the difficulties around swapping mappings around, KASAN expects
that the part of the shadow region that covers the vmalloc space will
-not be covered by the early shadow page, but will be left
-unmapped. This will require changes in arch-specific code.
+not be covered by the early shadow page but will be left unmapped.
+This will require changes in arch-specific code.
-This allows ``VMAP_STACK`` support on x86, and can simplify support of
+This allows ``VMAP_STACK`` support on x86 and can simplify support of
architectures that do not have a fixed module region.
-CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST and CONFIG_KASAN_MODULE_TEST
-----------------------------------------------------
+For developers
+--------------
-KASAN tests consist of two parts:
+Ignoring accesses
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Software KASAN modes use compiler instrumentation to insert validity checks.
+Such instrumentation might be incompatible with some parts of the kernel, and
+therefore needs to be disabled.
+
+Other parts of the kernel might access metadata for allocated objects.
+Normally, KASAN detects and reports such accesses, but in some cases (e.g.,
+in memory allocators), these accesses are valid.
+
+For software KASAN modes, to disable instrumentation for a specific file or
+directory, add a ``KASAN_SANITIZE`` annotation to the respective kernel
+Makefile:
+
+- For a single file (e.g., main.o)::
+
+ KASAN_SANITIZE_main.o := n
+
+- For all files in one directory::
+
+ KASAN_SANITIZE := n
+
+For software KASAN modes, to disable instrumentation on a per-function basis,
+use the KASAN-specific ``__no_sanitize_address`` function attribute or the
+generic ``noinstr`` one.
+
+Note that disabling compiler instrumentation (either on a per-file or a
+per-function basis) makes KASAN ignore the accesses that happen directly in
+that code for software KASAN modes. It does not help when the accesses happen
+indirectly (through calls to instrumented functions) or with the hardware
+tag-based mode that does not use compiler instrumentation.
+
+For software KASAN modes, to disable KASAN reports in a part of the kernel code
+for the current task, annotate this part of the code with a
+``kasan_disable_current()``/``kasan_enable_current()`` section. This also
+disables the reports for indirect accesses that happen through function calls.
+
+For tag-based KASAN modes (include the hardware one), to disable access
+checking, use ``kasan_reset_tag()`` or ``page_kasan_tag_reset()``. Note that
+temporarily disabling access checking via ``page_kasan_tag_reset()`` requires
+saving and restoring the per-page KASAN tag via
+``page_kasan_tag``/``page_kasan_tag_set``.
+
+Tests
+~~~~~
+
+There are KASAN tests that allow verifying that KASAN works and can detect
+certain types of memory corruptions. The tests consist of two parts:
1. Tests that are integrated with the KUnit Test Framework. Enabled with
``CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST``. These tests can be run and partially verified
-automatically in a few different ways, see the instructions below.
+automatically in a few different ways; see the instructions below.
2. Tests that are currently incompatible with KUnit. Enabled with
``CONFIG_KASAN_MODULE_TEST`` and can only be run as a module. These tests can
-only be verified manually, by loading the kernel module and inspecting the
+only be verified manually by loading the kernel module and inspecting the
kernel log for KASAN reports.
-Each KUnit-compatible KASAN test prints a KASAN report if an error is detected.
-Then the test prints its number and status.
+Each KUnit-compatible KASAN test prints one of multiple KASAN reports if an
+error is detected. Then the test prints its number and status.
When a test passes::
@@ -405,30 +461,24 @@ Or, if one of the tests failed::
not ok 1 - kasan
-
There are a few ways to run KUnit-compatible KASAN tests.
1. Loadable module
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-With ``CONFIG_KUNIT`` enabled, ``CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST`` can be built as
-a loadable module and run on any architecture that supports KASAN by loading
-the module with insmod or modprobe. The module is called ``test_kasan``.
+ With ``CONFIG_KUNIT`` enabled, KASAN-KUnit tests can be built as a loadable
+ module and run by loading ``test_kasan.ko`` with ``insmod`` or ``modprobe``.
2. Built-In
-~~~~~~~~~~~
-With ``CONFIG_KUNIT`` built-in, ``CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST`` can be built-in
-on any architecure that supports KASAN. These and any other KUnit tests enabled
-will run and print the results at boot as a late-init call.
+ With ``CONFIG_KUNIT`` built-in, KASAN-KUnit tests can be built-in as well.
+ In this case, the tests will run at boot as a late-init call.
3. Using kunit_tool
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-With ``CONFIG_KUNIT`` and ``CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST`` built-in, it's also
-possible use ``kunit_tool`` to see the results of these and other KUnit tests
-in a more readable way. This will not print the KASAN reports of the tests that
-passed. Use `KUnit documentation <https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/dev-tools/kunit/index.html>`_
-for more up-to-date information on ``kunit_tool``.
+ With ``CONFIG_KUNIT`` and ``CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST`` built-in, it is also
+ possible to use ``kunit_tool`` to see the results of KUnit tests in a more
+ readable way. This will not print the KASAN reports of the tests that passed.
+ See `KUnit documentation <https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/dev-tools/kunit/index.html>`_
+ for more up-to-date information on ``kunit_tool``.
.. _KUnit: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/dev-tools/kunit/index.html
diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst
index be7a0b0e1f28..d85ce238ace7 100644
--- a/Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst
+++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+.. Copyright (C) 2019, Google LLC.
+
The Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN)
========================================
diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kselftest.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kselftest.rst
index a901def730d9..dcefee707ccd 100644
--- a/Documentation/dev-tools/kselftest.rst
+++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kselftest.rst
@@ -239,8 +239,8 @@ using a shell script test runner. ``kselftest/module.sh`` is designed
to facilitate this process. There is also a header file provided to
assist writing kernel modules that are for use with kselftest:
-- ``tools/testing/kselftest/kselftest_module.h``
-- ``tools/testing/kselftest/kselftest/module.sh``
+- ``tools/testing/selftests/kselftest_module.h``
+- ``tools/testing/selftests/kselftest/module.sh``
How to use
----------
diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kunit/tips.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kunit/tips.rst
index a6ca0af14098..8d8c238f7f79 100644
--- a/Documentation/dev-tools/kunit/tips.rst
+++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kunit/tips.rst
@@ -78,8 +78,82 @@ Similarly to the above, it can be useful to add test-specific logic.
void test_only_hook(void) { }
#endif
-TODO(dlatypov@google.com): add an example of using ``current->kunit_test`` in
-such a hook when it's not only updated for ``CONFIG_KASAN=y``.
+This test-only code can be made more useful by accessing the current kunit
+test, see below.
+
+Accessing the current test
+--------------------------
+
+In some cases, you need to call test-only code from outside the test file, e.g.
+like in the example above or if you're providing a fake implementation of an
+ops struct.
+There is a ``kunit_test`` field in ``task_struct``, so you can access it via
+``current->kunit_test``.
+
+Here's a slightly in-depth example of how one could implement "mocking":
+
+.. code-block:: c
+
+ #include <linux/sched.h> /* for current */
+
+ struct test_data {
+ int foo_result;
+ int want_foo_called_with;
+ };
+
+ static int fake_foo(int arg)
+ {
+ struct kunit *test = current->kunit_test;
+ struct test_data *test_data = test->priv;
+
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, test_data->want_foo_called_with, arg);
+ return test_data->foo_result;
+ }
+
+ static void example_simple_test(struct kunit *test)
+ {
+ /* Assume priv is allocated in the suite's .init */
+ struct test_data *test_data = test->priv;
+
+ test_data->foo_result = 42;
+ test_data->want_foo_called_with = 1;
+
+ /* In a real test, we'd probably pass a pointer to fake_foo somewhere
+ * like an ops struct, etc. instead of calling it directly. */
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, fake_foo(1), 42);
+ }
+
+
+Note: here we're able to get away with using ``test->priv``, but if you wanted
+something more flexible you could use a named ``kunit_resource``, see :doc:`api/test`.
+
+Failing the current test
+------------------------
+
+But sometimes, you might just want to fail the current test. In that case, we
+have ``kunit_fail_current_test(fmt, args...)`` which is defined in ``<kunit/test-bug.h>`` and
+doesn't require pulling in ``<kunit/test.h>``.
+
+E.g. say we had an option to enable some extra debug checks on some data structure:
+
+.. code-block:: c
+
+ #include <kunit/test-bug.h>
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_EXTRA_DEBUG_CHECKS
+ static void validate_my_data(struct data *data)
+ {
+ if (is_valid(data))
+ return;
+
+ kunit_fail_current_test("data %p is invalid", data);
+
+ /* Normal, non-KUnit, error reporting code here. */
+ }
+ #else
+ static void my_debug_function(void) { }
+ #endif
+
Customizing error messages
--------------------------
diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/testing-overview.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/testing-overview.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b5b46709969c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/testing-overview.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+====================
+Kernel Testing Guide
+====================
+
+
+There are a number of different tools for testing the Linux kernel, so knowing
+when to use each of them can be a challenge. This document provides a rough
+overview of their differences, and how they fit together.
+
+
+Writing and Running Tests
+=========================
+
+The bulk of kernel tests are written using either the kselftest or KUnit
+frameworks. These both provide infrastructure to help make running tests and
+groups of tests easier, as well as providing helpers to aid in writing new
+tests.
+
+If you're looking to verify the behaviour of the Kernel — particularly specific
+parts of the kernel — then you'll want to use KUnit or kselftest.
+
+
+The Difference Between KUnit and kselftest
+------------------------------------------
+
+KUnit (Documentation/dev-tools/kunit/index.rst) is an entirely in-kernel system
+for "white box" testing: because test code is part of the kernel, it can access
+internal structures and functions which aren't exposed to userspace.
+
+KUnit tests therefore are best written against small, self-contained parts
+of the kernel, which can be tested in isolation. This aligns well with the
+concept of 'unit' testing.
+
+For example, a KUnit test might test an individual kernel function (or even a
+single codepath through a function, such as an error handling case), rather
+than a feature as a whole.
+
+This also makes KUnit tests very fast to build and run, allowing them to be
+run frequently as part of the development process.
+
+There is a KUnit test style guide which may give further pointers in
+Documentation/dev-tools/kunit/style.rst
+
+
+kselftest (Documentation/dev-tools/kselftest.rst), on the other hand, is
+largely implemented in userspace, and tests are normal userspace scripts or
+programs.
+
+This makes it easier to write more complicated tests, or tests which need to
+manipulate the overall system state more (e.g., spawning processes, etc.).
+However, it's not possible to call kernel functions directly from kselftest.
+This means that only kernel functionality which is exposed to userspace somehow
+(e.g. by a syscall, device, filesystem, etc.) can be tested with kselftest. To
+work around this, some tests include a companion kernel module which exposes
+more information or functionality. If a test runs mostly or entirely within the
+kernel, however, KUnit may be the more appropriate tool.
+
+kselftest is therefore suited well to tests of whole features, as these will
+expose an interface to userspace, which can be tested, but not implementation
+details. This aligns well with 'system' or 'end-to-end' testing.
+
+For example, all new system calls should be accompanied by kselftest tests.
+
+Code Coverage Tools
+===================
+
+The Linux Kernel supports two different code coverage measurement tools. These
+can be used to verify that a test is executing particular functions or lines
+of code. This is useful for determining how much of the kernel is being tested,
+and for finding corner-cases which are not covered by the appropriate test.
+
+:doc:`gcov` is GCC's coverage testing tool, which can be used with the kernel
+to get global or per-module coverage. Unlike KCOV, it does not record per-task
+coverage. Coverage data can be read from debugfs, and interpreted using the
+usual gcov tooling.
+
+:doc:`kcov` is a feature which can be built in to the kernel to allow
+capturing coverage on a per-task level. It's therefore useful for fuzzing and
+other situations where information about code executed during, for example, a
+single syscall is useful.
+
+
+Dynamic Analysis Tools
+======================
+
+The kernel also supports a number of dynamic analysis tools, which attempt to
+detect classes of issues when they occur in a running kernel. These typically
+each look for a different class of bugs, such as invalid memory accesses,
+concurrency issues such as data races, or other undefined behaviour like
+integer overflows.
+
+Some of these tools are listed below:
+
+* kmemleak detects possible memory leaks. See
+ Documentation/dev-tools/kmemleak.rst
+* KASAN detects invalid memory accesses such as out-of-bounds and
+ use-after-free errors. See Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst
+* UBSAN detects behaviour that is undefined by the C standard, like integer
+ overflows. See Documentation/dev-tools/ubsan.rst
+* KCSAN detects data races. See Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst
+* KFENCE is a low-overhead detector of memory issues, which is much faster than
+ KASAN and can be used in production. See Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst
+* lockdep is a locking correctness validator. See
+ Documentation/locking/lockdep-design.rst
+* There are several other pieces of debug instrumentation in the kernel, many
+ of which can be found in lib/Kconfig.debug
+
+These tools tend to test the kernel as a whole, and do not "pass" like
+kselftest or KUnit tests. They can be combined with KUnit or kselftest by
+running tests on a kernel with these tools enabled: you can then be sure
+that none of these errors are occurring during the test.
+
+Some of these tools integrate with KUnit or kselftest and will
+automatically fail tests if an issue is detected.
+