diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity')
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/digsig.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 30 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/iint.c | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c | 9 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 23 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 11 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 20 |
11 files changed, 77 insertions, 40 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c index 250fb0836156..3b06a01bd0fd 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c @@ -111,6 +111,8 @@ static int __init __integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id, } else { if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM) set_platform_trusted_keys(keyring[id]); + if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA) + load_module_cert(keyring[id]); } return err; diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c index a662024b4c70..23240d793b07 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c @@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, { struct public_key_signature pks; struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)sig; + const struct public_key *pk; struct key *key; int ret; @@ -105,23 +106,20 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, memset(&pks, 0, sizeof(pks)); pks.hash_algo = hash_algo_name[hdr->hash_algo]; - switch (hdr->hash_algo) { - case HASH_ALGO_STREEBOG_256: - case HASH_ALGO_STREEBOG_512: - /* EC-RDSA and Streebog should go together. */ - pks.pkey_algo = "ecrdsa"; - pks.encoding = "raw"; - break; - case HASH_ALGO_SM3_256: - /* SM2 and SM3 should go together. */ - pks.pkey_algo = "sm2"; - pks.encoding = "raw"; - break; - default: - pks.pkey_algo = "rsa"; + + pk = asymmetric_key_public_key(key); + pks.pkey_algo = pk->pkey_algo; + if (!strcmp(pk->pkey_algo, "rsa")) pks.encoding = "pkcs1"; - break; - } + else if (!strncmp(pk->pkey_algo, "ecdsa-", 6)) + /* edcsa-nist-p192 etc. */ + pks.encoding = "x962"; + else if (!strcmp(pk->pkey_algo, "ecrdsa") || + !strcmp(pk->pkey_algo, "sm2")) + pks.encoding = "raw"; + else + return -ENOPKG; + pks.digest = (u8 *)data; pks.digest_size = datalen; pks.s = hdr->sig; diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c index 1d20003243c3..fca8a9409e4a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c @@ -98,6 +98,14 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode) struct rb_node *node, *parent = NULL; struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, *test_iint; + /* + * The integrity's "iint_cache" is initialized at security_init(), + * unless it is not included in the ordered list of LSMs enabled + * on the boot command line. + */ + if (!iint_cache) + panic("%s: lsm=integrity required.\n", __func__); + iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); if (iint) return iint; @@ -152,7 +160,7 @@ void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode) static void init_once(void *foo) { - struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = foo; + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = (struct integrity_iint_cache *) foo; memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint)); iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 8e8b5251550e..f0e448ed1f9f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -24,10 +24,6 @@ #include "../integrity.h" -#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC -#include <asm/ima.h> -#endif - enum ima_show_type { IMA_SHOW_BINARY, IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN, IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT, IMA_SHOW_ASCII }; enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8, TPM_PCR10 = 10 }; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 565e33ff19d0..4e5eb0236278 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, if (!ima_appraise) return 0; - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c index e29bea3dd4cc..667887665823 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include <linux/seq_file.h> #include <linux/vmalloc.h> #include <linux/kexec.h> +#include <linux/of.h> #include "ima.h" #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC @@ -123,12 +124,8 @@ void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image) return; } - ret = arch_ima_add_kexec_buffer(image, kbuf.mem, kexec_segment_size); - if (ret) { - pr_err("Error passing over kexec measurement buffer.\n"); - return; - } - + image->ima_buffer_addr = kbuf.mem; + image->ima_buffer_size = kexec_segment_size; image->ima_buffer = kexec_buffer; pr_debug("kexec measurement buffer for the loaded kernel at 0x%lx.\n", diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 9ef748ea829f..906c1d8e0b71 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) u32 secid; if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) { - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK); } @@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot) !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) return 0; - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file); action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(vma->vm_file), inode, current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, @@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) int ret; u32 secid; - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); if (ret) @@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) } /** - * ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement. + * ima_file_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement. * @file: pointer to the file to be measured * @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC or MAY_APPEND * @@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) { u32 secid; - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); @@ -606,6 +606,9 @@ void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; int must_appraise; + if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) + return; + must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(mnt_userns, inode, MAY_ACCESS, FILE_CHECK); if (!must_appraise) @@ -636,6 +639,9 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; int must_appraise; + if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) + return; + must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(mnt_userns, inode, MAY_ACCESS, FILE_CHECK); if (!must_appraise) @@ -686,7 +692,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id, /* Read entire file for all partial reads. */ func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, MAY_READ, func); } @@ -729,7 +735,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, } func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size, MAY_READ, func); } @@ -780,6 +786,7 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n"); return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ } + break; default: break; } @@ -872,7 +879,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, * buffer measurements. */ if (func) { - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); action = ima_get_action(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template, func_data); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 4f8cb155e4fd..fd5d46e511f1 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -599,6 +599,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rule); + break; default: break; } @@ -836,6 +837,7 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) add_rules(default_measurement_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(default_measurement_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); + break; default: break; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c index e22e510ae92d..4e081e650047 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c @@ -494,8 +494,8 @@ int ima_restore_measurement_list(loff_t size, void *buf) } } - entry->pcr = !ima_canonical_fmt ? *(hdr[HDR_PCR].data) : - le32_to_cpu(*(hdr[HDR_PCR].data)); + entry->pcr = !ima_canonical_fmt ? *(u32 *)(hdr[HDR_PCR].data) : + le32_to_cpu(*(u32 *)(hdr[HDR_PCR].data)); ret = ima_restore_measurement_entry(entry); if (ret < 0) break; diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c index c5ba695c10e3..5604bd57c990 100644 --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c @@ -56,6 +56,15 @@ static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary(const char *source, } /* + * Add an X509 cert to the revocation list. + */ +static __init void uefi_revocation_list_x509(const char *source, + const void *data, size_t len) +{ + add_key_to_revocation_list(data, len); +} + +/* * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in * the UEFI db and MokListRT tables. */ @@ -76,5 +85,7 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *sig_type) return uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs; if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_sha256_guid) == 0) return uefi_blacklist_binary; + if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0) + return uefi_revocation_list_x509; return 0; } diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c index ee4b4c666854..f290f78c3f30 100644 --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c @@ -132,8 +132,9 @@ static int __init load_moklist_certs(void) static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) { efi_guid_t secure_var = EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID; - void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL; - unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0; + efi_guid_t mok_var = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID; + void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *mokx = NULL; + unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0, mokxsize = 0; efi_status_t status; int rc = 0; @@ -175,6 +176,21 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) kfree(dbx); } + mokx = get_cert_list(L"MokListXRT", &mok_var, &mokxsize, &status); + if (!mokx) { + if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND) + pr_debug("mokx variable wasn't found\n"); + else + pr_info("Couldn't get mokx list\n"); + } else { + rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListXRT", + mokx, mokxsize, + get_handler_for_dbx); + if (rc) + pr_err("Couldn't parse mokx signatures %d\n", rc); + kfree(mokx); + } + /* Load the MokListRT certs */ rc = load_moklist_certs(); |