From e3f20ae21079ecac282df65d83865c5771f4bca0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2018 13:25:29 -0400 Subject: security_file_open(): lose cred argument Acked-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- security/security.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'security/security.c') diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 68f46d849abe..235b35f58a65 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -970,11 +970,11 @@ int security_file_receive(struct file *file) return call_int_hook(file_receive, 0, file); } -int security_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) +int security_file_open(struct file *file) { int ret; - ret = call_int_hook(file_open, 0, file, cred); + ret = call_int_hook(file_open, 0, file, file->f_cred); if (ret) return ret; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9481769208b5e39b871ae4e89f5328c776ec38dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2018 14:13:18 -0400 Subject: ->file_open(): lose cred argument Acked-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 2 +- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 4 ++-- security/security.c | 2 +- security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 ++-- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 6 +++--- security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 2 +- 6 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) (limited to 'security/security.c') diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 8f1131c8dd54..a8ee106b865d 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -1569,7 +1569,7 @@ union security_list_options { int (*file_send_sigiotask)(struct task_struct *tsk, struct fown_struct *fown, int sig); int (*file_receive)(struct file *file); - int (*file_open)(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred); + int (*file_open)(struct file *file); int (*task_alloc)(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags); void (*task_free)(struct task_struct *task); diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 74f17376202b..8b8b70620bbe 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ static int apparmor_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) return common_perm_cond(OP_GETATTR, path, AA_MAY_GETATTR); } -static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) +static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file) { struct aa_file_ctx *fctx = file_ctx(file); struct aa_label *label; @@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) return 0; } - label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); + label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(file->f_cred); if (!unconfined(label)) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode }; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 235b35f58a65..5dce67070cdf 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -974,7 +974,7 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file) { int ret; - ret = call_int_hook(file_open, 0, file, file->f_cred); + ret = call_int_hook(file_open, 0, file); if (ret) return ret; diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 2b5ee5fbd652..18006be15713 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3862,7 +3862,7 @@ static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file) return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file)); } -static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) +static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file) { struct file_security_struct *fsec; struct inode_security_struct *isec; @@ -3886,7 +3886,7 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) * new inode label or new policy. * This check is not redundant - do not remove. */ - return file_path_has_perm(cred, file, open_file_to_av(file)); + return file_path_has_perm(file->f_cred, file, open_file_to_av(file)); } /* task security operations */ diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 7ad226018f51..e7b6c012431d 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -1927,9 +1927,9 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file) * * Returns 0 */ -static int smack_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) +static int smack_file_open(struct file *file) { - struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security; + struct task_smack *tsp = file->f_cred->security; struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct smk_audit_info ad; int rc; @@ -1937,7 +1937,7 @@ static int smack_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH); smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path); rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad); - rc = smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, MAY_READ, rc); + rc = smk_bu_credfile(file->f_cred, file, MAY_READ, rc); return rc; } diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c index 213b8c593668..9f932e2d6852 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c @@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ static int tomoyo_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, * * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. */ -static int tomoyo_file_open(struct file *f, const struct cred *cred) +static int tomoyo_file_open(struct file *f) { int flags = f->f_flags; /* Don't check read permission here if called from do_execve(). */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 377179cd28cd417dcfb4396edb824533431e607e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mimi Zohar Date: Fri, 13 Jul 2018 14:05:56 -0400 Subject: security: define new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data Differentiate between the kernel reading a file specified by userspace from the kernel loading a buffer containing data provided by userspace. This patch defines a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data(). Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Cc: Eric Biederman Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Casey Schaufler Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Acked-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: James Morris --- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ++++++ include/linux/security.h | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/security.c | 5 +++++ 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+) (limited to 'security/security.c') diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 8f1131c8dd54..a08bc2587b96 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -576,6 +576,10 @@ * userspace to load a kernel module with the given name. * @kmod_name name of the module requested by the kernel * Return 0 if successful. + * @kernel_load_data: + * Load data provided by userspace. + * @id kernel load data identifier + * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @kernel_read_file: * Read a file specified by userspace. * @file contains the file structure pointing to the file being read @@ -1582,6 +1586,7 @@ union security_list_options { int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid); int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode); int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name); + int (*kernel_load_data)(enum kernel_load_data_id id); int (*kernel_read_file)(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id); int (*kernel_post_read_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id id); @@ -1872,6 +1877,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads { struct hlist_head cred_getsecid; struct hlist_head kernel_act_as; struct hlist_head kernel_create_files_as; + struct hlist_head kernel_load_data; struct hlist_head kernel_read_file; struct hlist_head kernel_post_read_file; struct hlist_head kernel_module_request; diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 63030c85ee19..3410acfe139c 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -159,6 +159,27 @@ extern int mmap_min_addr_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, typedef int (*initxattrs) (struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr_array, void *fs_data); + +/* Keep the kernel_load_data_id enum in sync with kernel_read_file_id */ +#define __data_id_enumify(ENUM, dummy) LOADING_ ## ENUM, +#define __data_id_stringify(dummy, str) #str, + +enum kernel_load_data_id { + __kernel_read_file_id(__data_id_enumify) +}; + +static const char * const kernel_load_data_str[] = { + __kernel_read_file_id(__data_id_stringify) +}; + +static inline const char *kernel_load_data_id_str(enum kernel_load_data_id id) +{ + if ((unsigned)id >= LOADING_MAX_ID) + return kernel_load_data_str[LOADING_UNKNOWN]; + + return kernel_load_data_str[id]; +} + #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY struct security_mnt_opts { @@ -320,6 +341,7 @@ void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid); int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid); int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode); int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name); +int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id); int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id); int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id id); @@ -909,6 +931,11 @@ static inline int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) return 0; } +static inline int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) +{ + return 0; +} + static inline int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id) { diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 68f46d849abe..c2de2f134854 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1056,6 +1056,11 @@ int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file); +int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) +{ + return call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id); +} + int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 16c267aac86b463b1fcccd43c89f4c8e5c5c86fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mimi Zohar Date: Fri, 13 Jul 2018 14:05:58 -0400 Subject: ima: based on policy require signed kexec kernel images The original kexec_load syscall can not verify file signatures, nor can the kexec image be measured. Based on policy, deny the kexec_load syscall. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Cc: Eric Biederman Cc: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: James Morris --- include/linux/ima.h | 7 +++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 ++ security/security.c | 7 ++++++- 5 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'security/security.c') diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 0e4647e0eb60..84806b54b50a 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #define _LINUX_IMA_H #include +#include #include struct linux_binprm; @@ -19,6 +20,7 @@ extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm); extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened); extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file); extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot); +extern int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id); extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id); extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id id); @@ -49,6 +51,11 @@ static inline int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) return 0; } +static inline int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) +{ + return 0; +} + static inline int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id) { return 0; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 354bb5716ce3..78c15264b17b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -232,6 +232,7 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v); #define IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES 0x08 #define IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE 0x10 #define IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY 0x20 +#define IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC 0x40 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index dca44cf7838e..71fecfef0939 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -496,6 +496,33 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, MAY_READ, func, 0); } +/** + * ima_load_data - appraise decision based on policy + * @id: kernel load data caller identifier + * + * Callers of this LSM hook can not measure, appraise, or audit the + * data provided by userspace. Enforce policy rules requring a file + * signature (eg. kexec'ed kernel image). + * + * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES. + */ +int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) +{ + if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) != IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) + return 0; + + switch (id) { + case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE: + if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC) { + pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n"); + return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ + } + default: + break; + } + return 0; +} + static int __init init_ima(void) { int error; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index cdcc9a7b4e24..d5b4958decc5 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -448,6 +448,8 @@ static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func) return IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE; else if (func == POLICY_CHECK) return IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY; + else if (func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK) + return IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC; return 0; } diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index c2de2f134854..4927e7cc7d96 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1058,7 +1058,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file); int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) { - return call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id); + int ret; + + ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id); + if (ret) + return ret; + return ima_load_data(id); } int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 83a68a06795fa47e77ea758f293a5946e9e02e84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Arnd Bergmann Date: Tue, 17 Jul 2018 22:23:37 +0200 Subject: security: export security_kernel_load_data function The firmware_loader can be built as a loadable module, which now fails when CONFIG_SECURITY is enabled, because a call to the security_kernel_load_data() function got added, and this is not exported to modules: ERROR: "security_kernel_load_data" [drivers/base/firmware_loader/firmware_class.ko] undefined! Add an EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL() to make it available here. Fixes: 6e852651f28e ("firmware: add call to LSM hook before firmware sysfs fallback") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/security.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'security/security.c') diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 4927e7cc7d96..6e149d0ffe33 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1065,6 +1065,7 @@ int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) return ret; return ima_load_data(id); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data); int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 87ea58433208d17295e200d56be5e2a4fe4ce7d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Tue, 17 Jul 2018 10:36:04 -0700 Subject: security: check for kstrdup() failure in lsm_append() lsm_append() should return -ENOMEM if memory allocation failed. Fixes: d69dece5f5b6 ("LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/security.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'security/security.c') diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 6e149d0ffe33..b49ee810371b 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -118,6 +118,8 @@ static int lsm_append(char *new, char **result) if (*result == NULL) { *result = kstrdup(new, GFP_KERNEL); + if (*result == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; } else { /* Check if it is the last registered name */ if (match_last_lsm(*result, new)) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6eb864c1d9dd1ef32b88e03c3f49d8be0dab7dcf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mikhail Kurinnoi Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2018 16:33:42 +0300 Subject: integrity: prevent deadlock during digsig verification. This patch aimed to prevent deadlock during digsig verification.The point of issue - user space utility modprobe and/or it's dependencies (ld-*.so, libz.so.*, libc-*.so and /lib/modules/ files) that could be used for kernel modules load during digsig verification and could be signed by digsig in the same time. First at all, look at crypto_alloc_tfm() work algorithm: crypto_alloc_tfm() will first attempt to locate an already loaded algorithm. If that fails and the kernel supports dynamically loadable modules, it will then attempt to load a module of the same name or alias. If that fails it will send a query to any loaded crypto manager to construct an algorithm on the fly. We have situation, when public_key_verify_signature() in case of RSA algorithm use alg_name to store internal information in order to construct an algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try to use alg_name in order to load kernel module with same name. 1) we can't do anything with crypto module work, since it designed to work exactly in this way; 2) we can't globally filter module requests for modprobe, since it designed to work with any requests. In this patch, I propose add an exception for "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" module requests only in case of enabled integrity asymmetric keys support. Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules for sure, we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup(). In this way we prevent modprobe execution during digsig verification and avoid possible deadlock if modprobe and/or it's dependencies also signed with digsig. Requested "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel module name formed by: 1) "pkcs1pad(rsa,%s)" in public_key_verify_signature(); 2) "crypto-%s" / "crypto-%s-all" in crypto_larval_lookup(). "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa," part of request is a constant and unique and could be used as filter. Signed-off-by: Mikhail Kurinnoi Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar include/linux/integrity.h | 13 +++++++++++++ security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ security/security.c | 7 ++++++- 3 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- include/linux/integrity.h | 13 +++++++++++++ security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ security/security.c | 7 ++++++- 3 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'security/security.c') diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h index 858d3f4a2241..54c853ec2fd1 100644 --- a/include/linux/integrity.h +++ b/include/linux/integrity.h @@ -44,4 +44,17 @@ static inline void integrity_load_keys(void) } #endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY */ +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + +extern int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name); + +#else + +static inline int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) +{ + return 0; +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS */ + #endif /* _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H */ diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c index ab6a029062a1..6dc075144508 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c @@ -115,3 +115,26 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, pr_debug("%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); return ret; } + +/** + * integrity_kernel_module_request - prevent crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*) requests + * @kmod_name: kernel module name + * + * We have situation, when public_key_verify_signature() in case of RSA + * algorithm use alg_name to store internal information in order to + * construct an algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try + * to use alg_name in order to load kernel module with same name. + * Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules, + * we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup(). + * + * In this way we prevent modprobe execution during digsig verification + * and avoid possible deadlock if modprobe and/or it's dependencies + * also signed with digsig. + */ +int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) +{ + if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,", 20) == 0) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index b49ee810371b..dbca03d3629b 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1032,7 +1032,12 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) { - return call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name); + int ret; + + ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name); + if (ret) + return ret; + return integrity_kernel_module_request(kmod_name); } int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1b1eeca7e4c19fa76d409d4c7b338dba21f2df45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Tue, 21 Aug 2018 21:56:13 -0700 Subject: init: allow initcall tables to be emitted using relative references Allow the initcall tables to be emitted using relative references that are only half the size on 64-bit architectures and don't require fixups at runtime on relocatable kernels. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180704083651.24360-5-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Acked-by: James Morris Acked-by: Sergey Senozhatsky Acked-by: Petr Mladek Acked-by: Michael Ellerman Acked-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt Cc: Bjorn Helgaas Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: James Morris Cc: Jessica Yu Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Nicolas Pitre Cc: Paul Mackerras Cc: Russell King Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: Steven Rostedt Cc: Thomas Garnier Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- include/linux/init.h | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- init/main.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++---------------- kernel/printk/printk.c | 16 +++++++++------- security/security.c | 17 ++++++++++------- 4 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-) (limited to 'security/security.c') diff --git a/include/linux/init.h b/include/linux/init.h index bc27cf03c41e..2538d176dd1f 100644 --- a/include/linux/init.h +++ b/include/linux/init.h @@ -116,8 +116,24 @@ typedef int (*initcall_t)(void); typedef void (*exitcall_t)(void); -extern initcall_t __con_initcall_start[], __con_initcall_end[]; -extern initcall_t __security_initcall_start[], __security_initcall_end[]; +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS +typedef int initcall_entry_t; + +static inline initcall_t initcall_from_entry(initcall_entry_t *entry) +{ + return offset_to_ptr(entry); +} +#else +typedef initcall_t initcall_entry_t; + +static inline initcall_t initcall_from_entry(initcall_entry_t *entry) +{ + return *entry; +} +#endif + +extern initcall_entry_t __con_initcall_start[], __con_initcall_end[]; +extern initcall_entry_t __security_initcall_start[], __security_initcall_end[]; /* Used for contructor calls. */ typedef void (*ctor_fn_t)(void); @@ -167,9 +183,20 @@ extern bool initcall_debug; * as KEEP() in the linker script. */ -#define __define_initcall(fn, id) \ +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS +#define ___define_initcall(fn, id, __sec) \ + __ADDRESSABLE(fn) \ + asm(".section \"" #__sec ".init\", \"a\" \n" \ + "__initcall_" #fn #id ": \n" \ + ".long " #fn " - . \n" \ + ".previous \n"); +#else +#define ___define_initcall(fn, id, __sec) \ static initcall_t __initcall_##fn##id __used \ - __attribute__((__section__(".initcall" #id ".init"))) = fn; + __attribute__((__section__(#__sec ".init"))) = fn; +#endif + +#define __define_initcall(fn, id) ___define_initcall(fn, id, .initcall##id) /* * Early initcalls run before initializing SMP. @@ -208,13 +235,8 @@ extern bool initcall_debug; #define __exitcall(fn) \ static exitcall_t __exitcall_##fn __exit_call = fn -#define console_initcall(fn) \ - static initcall_t __initcall_##fn \ - __used __section(.con_initcall.init) = fn - -#define security_initcall(fn) \ - static initcall_t __initcall_##fn \ - __used __section(.security_initcall.init) = fn +#define console_initcall(fn) ___define_initcall(fn,, .con_initcall) +#define security_initcall(fn) ___define_initcall(fn,, .security_initcall) struct obs_kernel_param { const char *str; diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c index b729e1f22838..3a6ce89e128f 100644 --- a/init/main.c +++ b/init/main.c @@ -902,18 +902,18 @@ int __init_or_module do_one_initcall(initcall_t fn) } -extern initcall_t __initcall_start[]; -extern initcall_t __initcall0_start[]; -extern initcall_t __initcall1_start[]; -extern initcall_t __initcall2_start[]; -extern initcall_t __initcall3_start[]; -extern initcall_t __initcall4_start[]; -extern initcall_t __initcall5_start[]; -extern initcall_t __initcall6_start[]; -extern initcall_t __initcall7_start[]; -extern initcall_t __initcall_end[]; - -static initcall_t *initcall_levels[] __initdata = { +extern initcall_entry_t __initcall_start[]; +extern initcall_entry_t __initcall0_start[]; +extern initcall_entry_t __initcall1_start[]; +extern initcall_entry_t __initcall2_start[]; +extern initcall_entry_t __initcall3_start[]; +extern initcall_entry_t __initcall4_start[]; +extern initcall_entry_t __initcall5_start[]; +extern initcall_entry_t __initcall6_start[]; +extern initcall_entry_t __initcall7_start[]; +extern initcall_entry_t __initcall_end[]; + +static initcall_entry_t *initcall_levels[] __initdata = { __initcall0_start, __initcall1_start, __initcall2_start, @@ -939,7 +939,7 @@ static char *initcall_level_names[] __initdata = { static void __init do_initcall_level(int level) { - initcall_t *fn; + initcall_entry_t *fn; strcpy(initcall_command_line, saved_command_line); parse_args(initcall_level_names[level], @@ -950,7 +950,7 @@ static void __init do_initcall_level(int level) trace_initcall_level(initcall_level_names[level]); for (fn = initcall_levels[level]; fn < initcall_levels[level+1]; fn++) - do_one_initcall(*fn); + do_one_initcall(initcall_from_entry(fn)); } static void __init do_initcalls(void) @@ -981,11 +981,11 @@ static void __init do_basic_setup(void) static void __init do_pre_smp_initcalls(void) { - initcall_t *fn; + initcall_entry_t *fn; trace_initcall_level("early"); for (fn = __initcall_start; fn < __initcall0_start; fn++) - do_one_initcall(*fn); + do_one_initcall(initcall_from_entry(fn)); } /* diff --git a/kernel/printk/printk.c b/kernel/printk/printk.c index 90b6ab01db59..918f386b2f6e 100644 --- a/kernel/printk/printk.c +++ b/kernel/printk/printk.c @@ -2788,7 +2788,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_console); void __init console_init(void) { int ret; - initcall_t *call; + initcall_t call; + initcall_entry_t *ce; /* Setup the default TTY line discipline. */ n_tty_init(); @@ -2797,13 +2798,14 @@ void __init console_init(void) * set up the console device so that later boot sequences can * inform about problems etc.. */ - call = __con_initcall_start; + ce = __con_initcall_start; trace_initcall_level("console"); - while (call < __con_initcall_end) { - trace_initcall_start((*call)); - ret = (*call)(); - trace_initcall_finish((*call), ret); - call++; + while (ce < __con_initcall_end) { + call = initcall_from_entry(ce); + trace_initcall_start(call); + ret = call(); + trace_initcall_finish(call, ret); + ce++; } } diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 47cfff01d7ec..736e78da1ab9 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -48,14 +48,17 @@ static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] = static void __init do_security_initcalls(void) { int ret; - initcall_t *call; - call = __security_initcall_start; + initcall_t call; + initcall_entry_t *ce; + + ce = __security_initcall_start; trace_initcall_level("security"); - while (call < __security_initcall_end) { - trace_initcall_start((*call)); - ret = (*call) (); - trace_initcall_finish((*call), ret); - call++; + while (ce < __security_initcall_end) { + call = initcall_from_entry(ce); + trace_initcall_start(call); + ret = call(); + trace_initcall_finish(call, ret); + ce++; } } -- cgit v1.2.3